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Congressional and Presidential War
Powers as a Dialogue: Analysis of the
Syrian and ISIS Conflicts
Charles Tiefer† & Kathleen Clark††
Much of the scholarship on war powers looks back on whether U.S.
military interventions were authorized, examining the President’s powers
under Article II of the Constitution, and congressional enactments.  That
legal question is important, but it does not capture the interactive nature of
the dynamic between Congress and the President.  This Article instead
focuses on the process of dialogue between Congress and the President
prior to the exercise of war powers.  We examine in detail how that dia-
logue operates in two recent episodes: the U.S. response to Syrian Presi-
dent Assad’s use of chemical weapons in 2013, and the rise of ISIS since
2014.  By examining the specifics of how the political branches interact, we
can assess whether the exercise of war powers is democratic and legitimate.
We see that Congress and the President take part in substantive consulta-
tion and dialogue, and through that dialogue, Congress and the public
become more informed about the interests at stake and the available
options.  The nation benefits from war powers dialogue between the two
political branches.
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Introduction: How the War Powers Dialogue Can Work
Two recent major episodes, the United States’ response to Syria’s use
of chemical weapons in 2013, and its war against the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (“ISIS”) since 2014, illustrate the complicated sequence of
actions and reactions by the executive and legislative branches that often
occurs in connection with the exercise of our nation’s war powers.  In
response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons in 2013, President Obama
initially proposed a military strike authorized by unilateral Presidential
power.1  Then he sought Congressional authorization for a military strike.2
But before any Congressional decision, he agreed to a diplomatic solution
with the assistance of Russia.3
In the war against ISIS, the President invited Congress to authorize a
proposed military mission.  But Congress did not vote on an authorization
bill.4  Meanwhile, the executive branch implemented a campaign of air
strikes, training the Iraqi military, and Special Forces missions.5  But Presi-
dent Obama refused to deploy “boots on the ground,” or regular combat
units.6  This combat strategy became an issue in the 2016 election.7  In
2017, the problem is one for President Trump.
1. Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-
of-power-in-syrian-conflict.html (“Kathryn Ruemmler, the White House counsel, said the
president believed a strike would be lawful, both in international law and domestic law,
even if neither the Security Council nor Congress approved it.  But the novel circum-
stances, she said, led Mr. Obama to seek Congressional concurrence to bolster its
legitimacy.”).
2. Id.
3. Dan Friedman & James Warren, President Obama Agrees to Pursue Diplomatic
Solution in Syria, but Remains “Ready to Respond,” N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/syria-accepts-chemical-weapons-proposal-
article-1.1450670.
4. Karoun Demirjian, Despite Ryan’s Attention, Deal on ISIS Fight Authorization Still
Elusive, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2016, at A3; David M. Herszenhorn, McConnell Clears Path
for Debate on Giving Obama Broad Powers to Combat ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/world/middleeast/mcconnell-clears-path-for-
debate-on-giving-obama-broad-powers-to-combat-isis.html; Cody M. Poplin, 35
Lawmakers Pen Bipartisan Letter Calling for ISIS AUMF, LAWFARE (Nov. 9, 2015), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/35-lawmakers-pen-bipartisan-letter-calling-isis-aumf.
5. David Martosko et al., Obama to Expand Air Strikes to “Degrade” ISIS Not Just
Protect Americans or Support Iraqi Forces, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www
.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2750436/Obama-ready-authoriz. . .gainst-ISIS-Syria-pre
pares-open-new-battle-defeat-terror-group.html; Roberta Rampton, Obama Ramps up Spe-
cial Forces Mission in Syria Against ISIS, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/obama-ramps-up-special-forces-syria_us_571e2ccfe4b0d004
2da9b58c; Mark Thompson, Can the U.S. Military Train the Iraqi Army to Victory Over
ISIS?, TIME (June 10, 2015), http://time.com/3916866/isis-iraqi-army-training.
6. John Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. State Dep’t, Opening Remarks Before the House
Foreign Affairs Comm. (2013) (stating that, “[w]e all agree there will be no American
boots on the ground”).
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An interactive dialogue between the two political branches of govern-
ment determined the United States’ role in both episodes.  This dialogue is
the constitutional duty, both textually and structurally, of the two
branches.  Unlike the usual exercise of constitutional powers, the dialogue
does not follow a regular, orderly, well-structured pattern.8  Instead, it is a
messy and, sometimes, disorderly process.9  But it is precisely this dia-
logue that enables the public to participate in decision-making about the
exercise of the nation’s war powers.
Through a robust and candid dialogue between the political branches,
the nation can calibrate the exercise of its war powers, ensure that a com-
mitment to war is roughly consistent with the views of the sovereign public,
and fulfill the Framers’ vision of both political branches being involved in
decisions to engage in war.
In this Article, we examine the process of inter-branch dialogue rather
than focusing only on the endpoint of that dialogue: whether a resulting
military action has been authorized by the Constitution.10  We believe that
an overly abstract and formal analyses focused purely on that binary deter-
mination fails to consider how the political branches actually interact and
influence each other prior to war.  We analyze the elected branches’
dynamic interactions, their proposals and responses, and how interim and
partial steps play a key role in informing Congress and the people.  This
process has significance even where Congress does not formally enact
legislation.
The process is a dialogue, as factions within Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch talk back and forth, push competing stances, propose interim
actions, and exchange signals while gauging the evolving public reaction.
Through this process, the government as a whole makes legitimate and
democratic progress.  It is “legitimate” because it gives both of the branches
the opportunity to play a role as the Framers intended.11  It is “democratic”
because when the broader public and elected representatives have truthful
information about the interests at stake and the available options, the dia-
logue can incorporate the truthfully-informed preferences of the broad pop-
ulation.12  The process often involves disorganization, miscommunication,
and zig-zagging stances and actions, but progresses nonetheless toward a
7. See Louis Jacobson, Hillary Clinton Wrong to Say She’s Only Candidate to Lay Out
a “Specific Plan” to Fight ISIS, POLITIFACT (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/
truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jan/27/hillary-clinton/hillary-clinton-wrong-say-shes-
only-candidate-lay.
8. See Geoffrey Corn & Eric T. Jensen, The Political Balance of Power Over the Mili-
tary: Rethinking the Relationship Between the Armed Forces, the President, and Congress, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 553, 563 (2007) (illustrating the lack of clarity regarding the relationship
between the Congress and the Executive).
9. See id.
10. Perhaps another way to view this is the difference between knowing a box score
and understanding the strategic decisions that a manager made during the game.
11. Jide Nzelibe, Are Congressionally Authorized Wars Perverse?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 907,
916 (2007).
12. Douglas Kriner, Accountability Without Deliberation? Separation of Powers in
Times of War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1288– 89 (2015).
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course of action or inaction.13
Part I discusses the model of war powers dialogue.  Among other
things, it discusses how a model focusing on the dynamic interaction
between Congress and the President describes and explains so much more
than a simple binary question of whether military action was “authorized”
or “not authorized.”  Part II addresses the U.S. response to President
Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, and notes that the dia-
logue shifted from a possible unilateral Presidential action to a period
when Congress considered whether to deny the requested authorization.
Part III addresses the U.S. response to ISIS’s occupation of Iraqi territory
from 2014 to 2016.14  The ultimate decision to use air strikes, military
training, and Special Forces missions, but not ground combat units,
resulted from both Executive intention and Congressional deliberation.15
The Conclusion highlights the importance of understanding the interactive
process that underlies the use of the United States’ war powers.
This Article refers to this process as a “dialogue” because the partici-
pants sometimes have a literal dialogue with each other.  For example, at
Congressional hearings, Executive Branch witnesses confront Senators or
Representatives.16  Sometimes they engage in another kind of dialogue,
such as when the President announces executive actions and Congres-
sional leaders propose legislation that would support the action or oppose
it.17  Sometimes the interaction is more of a “dance,” such as when the
President takes a series of steps and stances, and Congress takes its own
distinct series of steps and stances.18
I. The War Powers Dialogue
One can identify two contrasting models regarding the exercise of war
powers.19  Under one model, the “presidency [is] shorn of controls,” and
the President has “broad and exclusive executive power in the national
13. See id. at 1295– 96 (discussing the process of deliberation between Congress and
the President regarding war affairs and how the system may fail to produce quality
deliberation).
14. For prior treatment, see Olivia Gonzalez, Comment, The Pen and the Sword: Legal
Justifications for the United States’ Engagement Against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 133, 159– 60 (2015).
15. See Am. Soc’y. of Int’l. L., President Obama Seeks Statutory Authorization for the
Use of Military Force Against ISIL, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 429, 430– 32 (Kristina Daugirdas &
Julian Davis Mortenson eds., 2015).
16. See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD & CARLA E. HUMUD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43612, THE ISLAMIC STATE AND U.S. POLICY 10– 11 (2016) (discussing Congress hearing
on ISIS in 2015); Julia L. Chen, Note, Restoring Constitutional Balance: Accommodating
the Evolution of War, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1793– 94 (2012) (discussing Congressional
hearings on Libya in 2011).
17. See infra text accompanying note 307 (discussing Congressional authorizations
for 1991 Persian Gulf war and 2003 invasion of Iraq).
18. See generally RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, FOREIGN POLICY ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS (June 1, 1999) (illustrating how the President and Congress support or seek
to change each other’s policies respectively).
19. See generally HAROLD BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE
CONSTITUTION (2015).
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security realm.”20  This model can explain or justify the 2011 Libyan air-
strikes,21 and could have been invoked to justify presidentially authorized
airstrikes in response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons as well as air
strikes in response to ISIS.22
The second model focuses on Congress’s ability to constrain or deny
required authorization for Presidential action.23  This model suggests that
President Obama should have congressional authorization for any
response to ISIS rather than relying on unilateral assertions of executive
power.24  Even so, under this model, President Obama would have been
criticized for both his strained interpretation of an outdated Congressional
authorization, and, perhaps, for the late-2015 enlargement of the mandated
mission by engaging Special Forces against ISIS in Syria.25
These two approaches stand in tension with each other.  The first (the
“pro-Executive approach”) contends that the President has unilateral
authority under the Constitution.26  The second (the “pro-Congressional
approach”) contends that Congress can rein in the President’s exercise of
war powers.27  But they are both binary in the sense that they focus on the
question of whether or not the exercise of war powers was authorized.
Both approaches start from larger premises about the nature of the
acts that authorize war powers.  The pro-Executive approach works from
precedents built up over two centuries of executive action.  It uses these
20. Id. at 5.
21. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2082– 83 (2005); Chen, supra note 16, at 1793.
22. Kenneth R. Mayer, Executive Power in the Obama Administration and the Decision
to Seek Congressional Authorization for a Military Attack Against Syria: Implications for
Theories of Unilateral Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 821, 827; John Yoo, Like It or Not, Con-
stitution Allows President to Strike Syria Without Congressional Approval, FOX NEWS (Aug.
30, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/08/30/constitution-allows-obama-
to-strike-syria-without-congressional-approval.html.
23. Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 291, 297– 98 (2006) [hereinafter Tiefer, Appropriation Riders] (discussing Con-
gress’s history of placing legislative restrictions on foreign aid, and concluding that such
congressional efforts to remain involved in war policy is important to democracy). See
generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander-in-Chief at the Lowest
Ebb: A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 944, 941– 1112 (2008) (chronicling the
history of presidential war powers, and arguing that Congress has been an active partici-
pant in determining war policy).
24. Barron & Lederman, supra note 23, at 1101 (arguing that Presidents in the past
have understood that their wartime powers are constrained by legislatively-imposed
restrictions).
25. There is a new analysis that Presidents may well make strained interpretations as
a better alternative to battling on constitutional powers and issues.  Peter Shane, The
Presidential Statutory Stretch, 87 COLO. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (2016) (asserting that “it
turns out that legal arguments based on a statutory stretch are more facilitative of the
rule of law than would be bolder claims of exclusive executive authority under Article
II”).
26. See BRUFF, supra note 19, at 5 (describing the belief that the President is not
subject to congressional controls).
27. Barron & Lederman, supra note 23, at 692– 93; Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the
Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power Over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO
ST. L.J. 391, 393, 395 (2008).
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precedents to expand upon provisions in the Constitution that were them-
selves without explicit original war-making significance, such as the
clauses for “executive power” and “Commander in Chief.”28  The pro-Con-
gressional approach refers back to the Framers’ original consignment of
war powers to Congress in the clause about “declaring war,” and the uses
of legislative and appropriation provisions about war powers.29
Whatever one thinks of these approaches, someone applying either
approach, upon the initiation of a new war powers action, focuses upon
extracting static elements of a formal nature.  The goal of each approach is
to determine whether or not there is legal authorization, rather than exam-
ining the dynamic course of the whole process.  From this analysis, one
draws a conclusion about whether the military action was authorized or
not.
A different model is found in Professor Bruff’s recent work, Untrodden
Ground: How Presidents Interpret the Constitution.30  Professor Bruff deals
with a variety of subjects, including, importantly, war powers.  He traces
the lineage of the war powers doctrine from George Washington to Barack
Obama.31  The focus is not on whether particular war powers actions were
authorized, although that does get some attention.32  Rather, the focus is
on the dynamic process of war power initiation and conduct, and the vari-
ety of factors bearing upon that process.33  This Article uses an analogous
approach.
This approach does not fit the current war powers episodes into the
previously elaborated system of thought that focuses on the authority of
one branch over the other.  By contrast, it pays specific attention to newly
emerging, current practices, working up, from an analysis of the steps and
stances in the process rather than down, from a historically-framed
system.34
Certain interactions between Congress and the President stand out
from the Syria (2013) and ISIS (2014– 2016) episodes as making the pro-
28. The issues are analyzed, unsympathetically to executive positions, in Barron &
Lederman, supra note 24, at 1106– 07.
29. Id. at 1008, 1108.
30. BRUFF, supra note 19.  A somewhat similar distinction has been made by political
scientists operating on the subject also studied by the legal scholars.  Peter M. Shane,
Constitutionalism and War Making, 92 TEX. L. REV. 689, 690 (2014) (reviewing MARIAH
ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY (2013) and STEPHEN
M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013)).  An article entirely focused on
war powers following, roughly, this model, is Christopher A. Ford, War Powers as We
Live Them: Congressional-Executive Bargaining Under the Shadow of the War Powers Reso-
lution, 11 J.L. & POL. 609, 609– 708 (1995).
31. See Bruff, supra note 19, at 401– 55.
32. Id. at 413– 45.
33. Ford, supra note 30, at 614, traces the approach that some kinds of law are as
much or more about process rather than formal standards back to the “New Haven
School” of international law.
34. And, again, the approach does not produce a binary view of the war powers
action as authorized or not.  Rather, the focus concerns the dynamic interactions of the
President and Congress, and the workings of the dialogue process, rather than to charac-
terize and classify a few formal specifics for purposes of deciding authorization.
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cess democratic and legitimate, regardless of how pro-executive or pro-con-
gressional analysts would analyze them.  For instance, President Obama
engaged in genuine consultation with congressional leaders regarding
Syria’s use of chemical weapons in 2013, leading him to decide not to pro-
ceed unilaterally.35  And in 2014, President Obama invited Congress to
enact a legislative authorization for a U.S. military response to the conflict
with ISIS, which Congress may well have turned into a vehicle for limita-
tions or other expressions of its stance.36  Other analytical approaches gen-
erally give only lip service to presidential consultation with Congress.37
This may be for good reason.  Often, genuine consultation does not occur
at all, and when it does occur, it may be hard to objectively gauge how
robust that consultation is.  Informal methods of consultation do not eas-
ily fit into the binary analysis of whether or not military action was author-
ized.  But in 2013 and 2014, meaningful consultation definitely
occurred.38
This dynamic way of looking at war powers interactions is consistent
with the dominant model taken from Justice Jackson’s concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer.39 Jackson’s concurrence lays out a
model with three zones, with the middle zone a “twilight” in which Con-
gress has neither expressly authorized nor expressly forbidden executive
action.40  Commentators sometimes skip over the fact that the concurring
opinion placed great emphasis on the particular “dialogue” that occurred
in that case.41  President Franklin Roosevelt had asked Congress for power
to seize factories in the event of strikes.42  Congress had rejected this, even
during World War II, albeit by relatively informal amendment-considera-
tion actions.43
Based on his review of this particular dialogue between Congress and
the Executive, Jackson’s concurrence found weakness in the Executive’s
position.44  What is most interesting about Jackson’s concurrence is its
attention to the dynamic nature of the relationship between the executive
and legislative branches.  Justice Jackson cared little about the history of
the “declare war” clause or the precedents of the “Commander in Chief”
35. See Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on Syria (Aug.
31, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-presi-
dent-syria.
36. Jim Acosta & Jeremy Diamond, Obama ISIS Fight Request Sent to Congress, CNN
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/11/politics/isis-aumf-white-house-con-
gress/.
37. See BRUFF, supra note 19, at 5 (highlighting that those who advocate the “unitary
executive” view “slight the important and accepted role of Congress in controlling execu-
tive officers by . . . informal practices”).
38. Press Release, The White House, supra note 35.
39. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
40. Robert Bejesky, War Powers Pursuant to False Perceptions and Asymmetric Infor-
mation in the “Zone of Twilight,” 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 13– 14 (2012).
41. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 657– 58.
42. Id. at 612.
43. Id. at 601, 613.
44. Id. at 579, 638– 39.
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power.45  He cared much more about the actual interaction between the
two political branches.46  This “zone of twilight” analysis attended closely
to a highly significant sequence of steps in which the President sought
authorization and Congress vigorously rebuffed those requests (although
Congress did not enact a law expressly prohibiting Presidential action).47
The “dialogue” model— unlike other models— places great importance
on whether the Executive provides truthful information to the public and to
Congress, particularly at congressional hearings.48  After all, once Con-
gress has enacted a law, such as an authorization for war, the enactment is
not rendered null just because the Executive misled Congress or engaged in
prevarication.49  Moreover, wars have often taken directions that were com-
pletely unexpected at the start, such as when U.S. authorization for enter-
ing World War I led to the U.S. army invading Russia to fight the
Bolsheviks.50
The “dialogue” approach includes a focus on the Executive’s provision
of information because that is a large part of the interaction between Con-
gress and the President.51  The act of providing information is less formal
than the enactment of war authorization or a formal Presidential order for
military action without Congressional authorization.  But the nation’s exer-
cise of particular war powers is more likely to be viewed as democratic and
legitimate if the Executive has first candidly shared information with
Congress.
Three war powers actions over the last half-century illustrate the
importance of providing such truthful information.  The 1964 Gulf of Ton-
kin Resolution was passed by both Houses and signed by the President,
providing broad authority for military action in Vietnam.52  From the
binary frame of whether the Vietnam War was authorized, the Gulf of Ton-
kin Resolution seems to provide such authority.53  But the Johnson Admin-
istration was deceptive in obtaining that authorization.54  President
Johnson claimed his intent was limited to bombing North Vietnam and
failed to disclose that he would use the resolution to justify a huge, bloody
ground war.55  The “dialogue” model includes in its frame consideration of
the information that the Executive Branch provides to Congress, including
45. See id. at 635.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 657– 58.
48. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Comment, War and Uncertainty, 114 YALE L.J. 1405, 1413
(2005).
49. See id. at 1407.
50. See Ernest Zitser, “Dirty Place for Americans to Be”: Images of the Russian Civil
War in Siberia from the Robert L. Eichelberger Collection at the Duke University Libraries,
SLAVIC & EAST EUR. INFO. RESOURCES 29, 30 (2009).
51. See Damrosch, supra note 48, at 1413.
52. See id. at 1409.
53. Id.
54. See Robert Bejesky, Precedent Supporting the Constitutionality of Section 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 12– 13 (2012).
55. See John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitu-
tionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 891 (1990).
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whether that information was accurate.56
In 1987, after the Iran-Contra Affair was disclosed in the press and the
congressional investigation ensued, the Reagan Administration put for-
ward formal justifications for its actions.57  Although Congress had
enacted the Boland Amendments prohibiting the executive branch from
spending appropriations for logistical support of the Nicaraguan Contras,
the Reagan Administration nevertheless provided the Contras with logisti-
cal support.58  Supporters of President Reagan argued that the arms fund-
ing came not from appropriations but from foreign governments’
contributions.59  The model of expansive executive prerogative, focusing
on the formal source of the money, would seem to support this view.
But during 1984– 1986, the Reagan Administration’s statements to
Congress about the contras included multiple falsehoods.60  Much of the
Iran-Contra investigations focused on those falsehoods.61  The simple
binary models, with their limited focus on legal authorization, do not cap-
ture a critical aspect of constitutional war-making: whether the executive
branch’s communications to Congress and the public are truthful.
For the Iraq War that started in 2003, the Bush Administration had
obtained an authorization, passed in 2002 by both Houses and signed by
the President.  Congress authorized that war more than six months before
the U.S. invasion began.62  Formally, the war had congressional authoriza-
tion.  Yet the Bush Administration presented to Congress and the public a
highly misleading case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction
(“WMD”).63  The “dialogue” model captures the illegitimacy of this war in
ways that the binary model does not: the fact that a key predicate for con-
gressional authorization was the executive branch’s inaccurate assertions
to Congress and the public that Saddam Hussein had ready-for-action
WMD.
Moreover, congressional hearings serve an important function beyond
the mere one-way flow of information from the executive branch.  At hear-
ings, Congress can proactively probe the intentions of the President, expos-
ing weaknesses in the executive’s plan and enabling members of Congress
56. See, e.g., id. at 888– 89 (describing the factually inaccurate information that the
Administration gave to Congress about what happened in the Tonkin Gulf).
57. See Robert E. Gilbert, The Politics of Presidential Illness: Ronald Reagan and the
Iran-Contra Scandal, 33 POL. & LIFE SCI. 58, 71 (2014).
58. See Bejesky, supra note 54, at 24.
59. H.R. Rep. No. 100-433, pt. 1, at 18– 19 (1987).
60. See Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUND-
TABLE 143, 151 (1998).
61. Id.; see In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 6– 7 (D.C. 1997) (censuring former Assistant
Secretary of State Elliott Abrams for deceiving Congress).
62. A vigorous argument was made that Congress had only authorized a limited war,
and that President Bush had improperly escalated it beyond the Congressional mandate.
Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis
of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 459, 464 (2011).
63. See James P. Pfiffner, Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for
War with Iraq?, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 25, 28 (2004).
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to respond.64  A binary model, focused only on authorization, does not
take hearings seriously, denigrating them as mere talk rather than formal
legislative action.
Yet hearings may serve as a step or stance of limitation or, less often,
expansion of authority.  Hearings have taken on great importance in recent
war powers debates to resolve— among other key questions— whether the
President intends solely to conduct limited airstrikes (as against Serbia in
2000), or also intends to engage regular ground combat units in the fight.65
At hearings, members of Congress draw out from executive witnesses just
what level of force is intended, and have an opportunity to react to what
they say.
II. Syria 2013: The Dialogue in Action
In August 2013, Syria engaged in a major chemical weapons attack on
its own citizens.66  This immediately triggered White House consideration
of military action because President Obama had earlier stated that if the
Assad regime used chemical weapons, it would cross a “red line.”67
A. Air Strikes Considered
For the first few days, President Obama did not speak publicly.68
Rather, unnamed administration sources indicated that air strikes were
under consideration.69  The administration did not indicate whether it
would seek congressional authorization, and it appeared that the President
would act unilaterally.70  Congress was not even in session.71
President Obama took seriously the need to consult Congress.  There
64. For example, a hearing with testimony by Secretary of State John Kerry, right at
the point in 2013 when President Obama was weighing a unilateral air strike on Syria,
provided a key forum. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Michel R. Gordon, Kerry Becomes Chief
Advocate for U.S. Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
08/31/world/middleeast/john-kerry-syria.html.
65. See Steven B. Redd, The Influence of Advisers and Decision Strategies on Foreign
Policy Choices: President Clinton’s Decision to Use Force in Kosovo, 6 INT’L STUD. PERSP.
129, 139 (2005).
66. See Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399.
67. Matthew C. Waxman, Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutional War Powers, 123
YALE L.J. ONLINE 297, 297 (2013).
68. See Press Release, The White House, supra note 35 (President Obama first made
a statement about the Syrian chemical weapons attack ten days after it occurred).
69. But see Mark Landler, On Syria, a Drumbeat with Some Echoes of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/world/middleeast/on-syria-a-
drumbeat-with-some-echoes-of-iraq.html (suggesting that the Obama administration
would pursue missile strikes, but not a sustained air campaign).
70. See Chris Edelson & Donna G. Starr-Deelen, Libya, Syria, ISIS, and the Case
against the Energetic Executive, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 581, 581– 82 (2015).
71. See Jake Miller, Obama Seeks Syria Strike with Congress’ Approval, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-seeks-syria-strike-with-con-
gress-approval/ (President Obama announced on August 31, 2013 that Congress would
schedule and debate and a vote “as soon as Congress comes back into session”).
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were rapid developments in the last week of August.72  Speaker of the
House John Boehner sent the President a letter asking for a legal justifica-
tion for use of force.73  Obama spoke directly and substantively twice with
Speaker Boehner, and kept in touch with Boehner through his national
security officials.74  He also spoke with House Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi, and the Senate majority and minority leaders.75  All of the leaders
apparently wanted a congressional vote instead of unilateral executive
action.76
The consultation was not, as had happened so often in the past,77
mere notification.  Boehner apparently had strong misgivings about pro-
ceeding with military action without a vote,78 and promised to provide a
vote if the President sought one.79  Moreover, the procedure for the vote
would not be manipulated in a partisan way; instead, it would be what is
known as an “up or down” vote in which the President’s proposition would
be put before the representatives and they would have a simple, clear,
straightforward vote on it.80  Normally the Speaker has no obligation to
provide this, and his own majority party members may well prefer some
ingeniously arranged vote to give the President little chance.81
The President could have claimed unilateral executive authority for a
military strike against Syria on one of two grounds.  One would be the less
likely— but honest— ground of humanitarian intervention.  Recent prece-
dents for humanitarian intervention include the 2000 air campaign against
Serbia (regarding Kosovo) and the 2011 air campaign against Qaddafi’s
government in Libya.82  But both of those air campaigns had additional
72. See, e.g., Edelson & Starr-Deelen, supra note 70, at 595.
73. See Ashley Parker, Legislators Push for Vote before Strike, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/world/middleeast/legislators-push-for-
vote-before-strike.html.
74. See John Bresnahan, Hill Leaders Weigh Tough Syria Vote, POLITICO (Aug. 31,
2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/syria-vote-congress-leaders-096132;
Brett Logiurato, Obama and Congress Are Having a Big Meeting on Syria Today, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/syria-obama-congress-brief-
ing-authorization-2013-8.
75. See Michael A. Memoli, Obama Meets with Congressional Leaders on Islamic State
Strategy, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-
nn-obama-meeting-congress-20140909-story.html.
76. See Press Release, The White House, supra note 35.
77. See Eileen Burgin, Where’s the Consultation? The War Powers Resolution and Libya,
12 U.N.H. L. REV. 175, 194, 197– 98 (2014) (chronicling a history of mere notification
from presidents to Congress).
78. See Parker, supra note 73.
79. See Dave Boyer, In Reversal, Obama to Seek Congressional OK for Syria Strike,
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/31/
obama-set-speak-syria-white-house-115-pm-edt/.
80. See William Safire, Up-or-Down, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2005), http://www
.nytimes.com/2005/08/14/magazine/upordown.html?_r=0 (describing the process of
an up-or-down vote in Congress).
81. See Bresnahan, supra note 74 (discussing the difficulty Boehner will have con-
vincing his fellow Republicans to follow suit).
82. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33532, WAR POWERS RESOLU-
TION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE 4– 5, 11– 12 (2012).
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justification, including NATO’s support for both campaigns.83  The Obama
Administration may have wanted to engage in unilateral humanitarian
intervention in support of the “Arab Spring.”84  But the Republicans who
controlled the House opposed this, and the public was skeptical.85  The
Executive recognized that it faced political resistance to its claim that it had
broad power to use the military for humanitarian intervention.86  Humani-
tarian problems occur all over the globe, including in places without strong
American security interests.  A worldwide program of presidential unilat-
eral military interventions solely for humanitarian reasons would arouse
congressional and public backlash.
Alternatively, the President could justify this particular unilateral cam-
paign on the theory that Syria’s use of chemical weapons threatened Ameri-
can interests.87  A breakdown of the taboo against the use of chemical
weapons undermines tangible (non-humanitarian) American security
interests, particularly when their use may cause them to fall into the hands
of terrorist groups who could use them, directly or indirectly, against U.S.
targets.88  But a government’s use of chemical weapons in a civil war
within its own territory is less cognizable as a security threat to the United
States than the use of chemical weapons against other nations or its immi-
nent diversion to terrorists.89
Besides justification, another important issue regarding unilateral
presidential authorization for action against Syria concerned the scope of
the military engagement.  Two years earlier, in 2011, President Obama,
without seeking authorization by Congress, ordered an air campaign by
NATO in an effort to impose a no-fly zone over Libya.90  The Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel issued a war powers opinion pur-
porting to justify that unilateral Presidential action.91  That opinion cited
many precedents from the preceding decades, including an airstrike
against Libya in the 1980s, and the air campaign against Serbia (about
83. Id. at 4, 12– 13 (noting NATO’s support for both the Serbia and Libya
campaigns).
84. See Richard A.C. Alton & Jason Reed Struble, The Constitutionality and Advance-
ment of International Humanitarian Ideals in Libya by NATO and United States’ Opera-
tions Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, 13 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 14 (1990).
85. Kevin Liptak & Tom Coehn, Arab Spring Turmoil Evokes Political Response, CNN
(Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/12/politics/libya-egypt-fallout/index
.html.
86. Alton & Struble, supra note 84, at 14.
87. See Chemical Weapons in Syria, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, https://fas.org/issues/bio-
logical-chemical-and-other-non-nuclear-threats/chemical-weapons-syria/ (last visited
Oct. 6, 2016) (noting that there were rising concerns that terrorist organization could
acquire these chemical weapons in the event of state collapse).
88. S. REP. NO. 104-33, at 241 (1993).
89. Margaret Sewell, Freedom from Fear: Prosecuting the Iraqi Regime for the Use of
Chemical Weapons, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 365, 390– 91 (2004) (demonstrating relative
U.S. concern for use of chemical weapons).
90. Robert J. Delahunty, Warpowers Irresolution: The Obama Administration and the
Libyan Intervention, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 122, 124– 25 (2011).
91. Office of Legal Counsel, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 OPINIONS
OFF. LEGAL COUNS. 1, 1, 4– 6 (2001), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/libya.pdf.
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Kosovo) in 2000.92  The Libya opinion, in turn, served as an important
precedent for military action against Syria.93
The precedents suggest that the viability of a unilateral presidential
stance depends on the risks that American military forces face and the
likelihood of military success.94  An air strike against Syrian military
targets might appear, at first glance, to involve no U.S. combat troops on
the ground and limited risk of casualties for U.S. armed forces or Syrian
civilians.95
However the Administration did not initially limit itself to a single-
episode air strike, and did not explain how it would respond as the situa-
tion developed.96  Such vagueness left open a variety of options, depending
on how Syria reacted and whether other nations supported the United
States.97  It also avoided the negative congressional and public reaction
that would result from a commitment to a wider war.98
Analyzing the situation under a binary war powers model of unilateral
action would be indeterminate.99  On the one hand, the Presidential side
could cite precedents for unilateral air strikes: Libya (1986), Sudan and
Afghanistan (1998), Serbia (2000), and Libya (2011).100  As in these ear-
lier conflicts, air strikes would not risk American interests or significant
numbers of American casualties.101  Military action would reinforce the
global taboo against use of chemical weapons, and Congress was
adjourned.
On the other hand, the interests at stake were at least as much human-
92. Id. at 7, 12.  There was another important opinion, that of the State Depart-
ment’s Legal Adviser. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. On For-
eign Relations, 112th Cong. 53– 58 (2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S.
Dep’t of State).
93. Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part I: Polit-
ical Miscues and U.S. Law), JUST SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.justsecurity.org/
1158/koh-syria/ [hereinafter Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention]
(“Ruemmler is plainly invoking Walter Dellinger’s OLC Opinion on Bosnia, which Act-
ing Attorney General for OLC Caroline Krass followed in Libya in 2011.”).
94. Id. at 6 (stating that one of the criteria for the President to bypass the need for
congressional approval for military action is “if the operations are not expected to be . . .
‘sufficiently extensive in ‘nature, scope, and duration’ to constitute war”) (citations
omitted).
95. Syria (unlike Afghanistan in 2001) had a great many military targets.  It also had
air defenses, but the 1991 war with Iraq and the 2011 Libya campaign confirmed that
the United States could degrade these air defenses using missiles and stealth planes,
with a small risk of casualties. BLANCHARD & HUMUD, supra note 16, at 27.




99. See Savage, supra note 1.
100. GRIMMETT, supra note 82, at 20.
101. Id. at 14.  Libya is a good example.  In the House, as to the Libyan operations, a
resolution that would have disallowed the use of ground forces passed the House 268 to
145.  Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 466 n.236 (2012).
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itarian as security-related.102  There was time to ask Congress.103  As a
practical matter, the country was war-weary and more skeptical of the use
of force than during the earlier conflicts.104
In a dynamic interaction, it matters greatly whether the situation
allows time for consultation.  Given a little time, Congress may, on the pub-
lic’s behalf, probe the Administration’s intent and facts supporting military
action.105  Moreover, a congressional debate could occur, and the public,
watching Congress and the press, could develop its own view.
The military apparently advised President Obama that he did not have
to engage in an immediate strike.106  A delay would not prevent successful
strikes.107  That allowed time for congressional probing.108
This scenario highlights the enormous difference between treating the
analysis as a static binary assessment of whether the ultimate military
action was authorized, or as a description of the sequence of stances and
actions taken by the executive and legislative branches with varying claims
to justification.  In a dynamic interaction, it matters greatly that a quick
unilateral strike prevents Congress from having the time to gauge the mili-
tary and political risks of an Administration initiative.109  In 2013, the fact
that a unilateral air strike on Syria did not happen immediately enabled
congressional probing.110
B. President Obama Invites Congress to Decide
On August 31, 2013, President Obama announced that he would seek
congressional authorization for air strikes on Syria.111  What was the Pres-
ident’s reasoning for doing this?  Although much had to do with the specif-
102. James Uthmeier, Note, Redrawing the Red Line: The Constitution’s Limitation on
President Obama’s Ability to Use Military Force in Syria, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 875,
876– 77, 886 (2014) (noting that President Obama’s arguments were “shaky at best”).
103. See id. at 877 (noting that the President planned to seek authorization from Con-
gress for the use of force in Syria).
104. This was due both to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.  Charles M. Blow, Opinion,
War-Weariness, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/opin-
ion/blow-war-weariness.html [hereinafter Blow, War-Weariness]. See generally Charles
Tiefer, Can the President and Congress Establish a Legislative Veto Mechanism for Jointly
Drawing Down a Long and Controversial War?, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 131,
131– 66 (2012); Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-Aided
Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 1– 59 (2007).
105. Jonathan A. Bush, The Binding of Gulliver: Congress and Courts in an Era of Presi-
dential Warmaking, 80 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1738 (1994) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR
AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993))
(talking about the importance of congressional scrutiny for acts of war).
106. See Michael R. Gordon & Jackie Calmes, President Seeks to Rally Support for Syria
Strike, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1dy0cih.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Bush, supra note 105, at 1738 (explaining the importance of congressional
support for war).
110. See Gordon & Calmes, supra note 106.
111. Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in
Syria, N.Y. Times (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/mid-
dleeast/syria.html.
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ics of Syria, some of it related to President Obama’s views of war powers
more broadly.112  Segments of the public and Congress expressed opposi-
tion to even the preliminary statements of Administration intentions.113
Early public polls show an even division, and that division was mirrored in
Congress.114  Most of this opposition grew out of concern about the merits
of conducting air strikes in the midst of a civil war, but some of it grew out
of concern that the President was proceeding unilaterally instead of seek-
ing Congressional authorization.115
There is currently considerable domestic skepticism about unilateral
presidential war actions.  Some look back at the 1950s and 1960s as a
period in which Presidents had great power to act unilaterally and Con-
gress took a back seat.116  In the early 1970s, near the end of the Vietnam
War, skepticism toward presidential leadership came to the fore and was
codified by the 1973 War Powers Resolution.117  In the 1980s, Presidents
Reagan and George H.W. Bush built greater public support for limited uni-
lateral actions in Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama.118
The Clinton Administration presents a more complex picture: com-
pare the public’s anger when the deployment of Special Forces in Somalia
(1992– 1993) resulted in American casualties, with the public’s acquies-
cence to the bombing of Serbia regarding Kosovo (in 2000).119  During
George W. Bush’s 43rd Administration, the disenchantment with the Iraq
War so alienated the public that there was again, as after the Vietnam War,
a reaction against participation in another large-scale ground war.120
And for President Obama, members of two different political parties
112. See Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine: The President Explains his Hardest
Decisions about America’s Role in the World, ATLANTIC, Apr. 2016, at 75 (listing four fac-
tors that contributed to Obama’s decision to seek Congressional authorization, three of
which were specific to the situation in Syria).
113. Aaron Blake, Why Congress Could Reject Military Action in Syria, WASH. POST
(Aug. 31, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/08/30/why-
congress-could-reject-military-action-in-syria/; Blow, War-Weariness, supra note 104.
114. Blake, supra note 104; Blow, War-Weariness, supra note 104.
115. Baker & Weisman, supra note 111.
116. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 105, at 1723– 24 (detailing the attitudes of the country
toward unilateral Presidential power after World War II and before the Vietnam War).
117. Id. at 1724.
118. In Lebanon in 1983, President Reagan had unilaterally sent in Marines, but Con-
gress afterwards enacted an authorization limited in time. Id. at 1748; see Lori Fisler
Damrosch, The Clinton Administration and War Powers, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125,
130 (2000).
119. See Damrosch, supra note 118, at 133; Richard Morin, Poll Shows Most Americans
Want Negotiated Settlement, WASH. POST, May 18, 1999, at A18.
120. Charles M. Blow, Opinion, The Era of Disbelief, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/blow-the-era-of-disbelief.html; John Harwood
& Jonathan Weisman, House Republicans Say Voters Oppose Intervention (Sept. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/07/us/politics/house-republicans-say-constituents-
are-strongly-opposed-to-a-syria-strike.html (describing the American public’s resistance
to getting involved in Syria due to the experience in Iraq).
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combined to oppose presidential unilateralism:121 Republicans suspicious
in general of President Obama, intensified by a degree of neo-isolationist
attitude against getting involved based on humanitarian (rather than secur-
ity) interests;122 and anti-war Democrats who looked at all U.S.-initiated
wars through the skeptical perspective left by the Iraq War (and the earlier
Vietnam War).123
Interestingly, the relatively recent 2011 air campaign against Qaddafi’s
regime in Libya might have seemed a firm recent precedent for President
Obama.124  Although that action contributed to bringing down Qaddafi,
the precedent did not seem to support Obama in forging ahead without
congressional authorization in Syria because Syria involved an ongoing
civil war that had already caused hundreds of thousands of deaths.125
Another aspect concerns the personal war powers philosophy of the
President himself.  Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush may have
preferred presidential unilateralism as a basic belief.126  In contrast, Presi-
dent Obama acknowledged Congress’s role in authorizing war as part of
the constitutional order.127  The Syrian episode demonstrates dramatically
that a President may sometimes invite a congressional role.128
During this same time frame, the British House of Commons defeated
Prime Minister Cameron in a vote on the question of taking action against
Syria.129  In the British parliamentary government, it is unheard of for the
party in power to repudiate its own party head, the Prime Minister.130  No
121. Michael D. Shear, History Aside, Obama Bets on Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/politics/in-syria-decision-obama-
looks-to-an-old-opponent-congress.html.
122. See Harwood & Weisman, supra note 120; Jonathan Martin, Vote on Syria Sets Up
Foreign Policy Clash Between 2 Wings of G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/us/politics/syria-vote-sets-up-foreign-policy-clash-in-gop
.html.
123. See Shear, supra note 121 (noting that Obama faced some opposition from lib-
eral Democrats who were skeptical of war).
124. Jordan J. Paust, Constitutionality of U.S. Participation in the United Nations-
Authorization War in Libya, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 43, 46 (2012).
125. In addition, in Libya, a U.N. Security Council resolution supported military
action, NATO allies, especially Britain and France, were willing to take over most of the
aircraft sorties once the United States initially degraded Libya’s air defenses, and Qad-
dafi had been an American enemy for decades. See S.C. Res. 1973 ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011).
126. While President George H.W. Bush (41st Administration) contended that he had
unilateral authority for the first Persian Gulf War, he ultimately obtained formal Con-
gressional authorization before the 1991 invasion of Iraq. See H.R.J. Res. 77, 102d Cong.
(1991); George Bush: The Persian Gulf War, PROFILES U.S. PRESIDENTS, http://www.pre-
sidentprofiles.com/KennedyBush/GeorgeBushThepersiangulfwar.html (last visited Oct.
6, 2016).
127. See Goldberg, supra note 112 (indicating that the fourth factor leading Obama to
seek Congressional authorization was the fact that Obama “had come into office with
the strong belief that the scope of executive power in national-security issues is very
broad, but not limitless”).
128. See Savage, supra note 1 (quoting President Obama: “Mr. Obama argued that the R
United States should ‘get out of the habit’ of having the president ‘stretch the boundaries
of his authority as far as he can’ while lawmakers ‘snipe’ from the sidelines.”).
129. See Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 93.
130. See id.
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static approach to formal American war powers authority could account
for the effect of this U.K. development on presidential– congressional
relations.
In considering dynamic democratic processes, however, it is not sur-
prising that the U.K. Parliament’s vote against Syrian bombing would reso-
nate in the United States.  Parliament’s vote against bombing reflected a
powerful war-weariness after the Iraq War that the British shared with
Americans.131  And the parliamentary vote also indicated that the nor-
mally strong loyalty to a party leader— a Prime Minister or a President—
could be outweighed by war-weariness.
Critics of a dynamic approach may contend that war powers law does
not depend on “soft” informal aspects as public attitudes like the “Vietnam
War syndrome,” the actions of U.K.’s Parliament, or the differences in the
personal attitudes of Presidents Reagan and Obama.  In that view, any
analysis should focus on “hard” formal aspects, such as congressional
enactments, judicial precedents, and executive branch legal opinions.  But
the “soft” aspects are part of the interactive picture— the fuller picture— of
the war powers dialogue.
Once President Obama called for congressional authorization, the
congressional process came to the forefront.132  Congressional process
does not play a role when a President undertakes a sudden and purely
unilateral action, such as President Reagan’s invasion of Grenada and
bombing of Libya and George H.W. Bush’s invasion of Panama.133  But in
the Syrian chemical weapons matter, the engine of the democratic process
for war powers fully cranked up.134
Hearings are key to the democratic and legitimate exercise of war pow-
ers.  This Article departs from most war powers scholarship, which usually
ignore hearings.135  Compared to presidential orders or congressional
enactments, hearings may seem to be no more than just talk.  Hearings are
not conclusive in the rigid formal binary analysis of whether or not mili-
tary action is authorized.
The relevant congressional committees conducted hearings on the
131. See Mark Landler, David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Obama Set for Limited
Strike on Syria as British Vote No, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/08/30/us/politics/obamasyria.html.
132. See Baker & Weisman, supra note 111.
133. See Ctr. for Civic Ed., President Reagan as Commander in Chief, RONALD REAGAN
& EXECUTIVE POWER, http://reagan.civiced.org/lessons/president-reagan-commander-
chief (last visited Oct. 6, 2016); Louis Fisher, Ryan Hendrickson & Stephen R. Weiss-
man, Letter to the Editor, Congress at War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 2008), https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/congress-war; Michael J. Kelly,
The President Does Not Need Congressional Approval for Libya No-Fly Zone (Yet), JURIST
(Mar. 22, 2011, 5:08 PM), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2011/03/the-president-does-
not-need-congressional-approval-for-libya-no-fly-zone-yet.php.
134. Baker & Weisman, supra note 111.
135. But see MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHOR-
ITY 37– 38 (2013); Barron & Lederman, supra note 23, at 1041.
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issue136— most important of which were the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee’s questioning of Secretary of State John Kerry.137  These hearings
performed several important functions: they clarified the Administration’s
position regarding what military actions it would take; they unearthed the
Administration’s knowledge of, and the others’ insights about, conditions
in the sphere of fighting; and they engendered a public dialogue between
Congress and the electorate, allowing them to jointly formulate their
views.138
In these hearings, the Obama Administration was questioned about
whether it wanted the option to go beyond initial air strikes.139  This inevi-
tably engendered a negative reaction from a war-weary Congress and pub-
lic.140  These hearings unearthed the fact that even with air strikes
suppressing Syrian resistance, ground intervention would be required to
make sure that chemical weapons did not fall into dangerous hands.141
This led Congress and the public to look skeptically upon potential mili-
tary intervention.
Through hearings and broader public debates over various military
options, it quickly became apparent that the only proposals with a chance
of passage would have a limited duration, would explicitly rule out ground
combat units, and would focus the military response on Syria’s use of
chemical weapons.142
In recent decades, political debates over war powers authorization
have drawn sharp distinctions between air strikes and deployment of
136. Michael R. Gordon & Thom Shanker, In Hearing, House Panel Seems Split on
Syria Strike, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/world/
middleeast/in-hearing-house-panel-seems-split-on-syria-strike.html.
137. See Maureen Dowd, Opinion, Shadow of a Doubt, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/dowd-shadow-of-a-doubt.html (describ-
ing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee questioning of Secretary of State Kerry).
138. Mayer, supra note 22, at 828– 30 (detailing the events and results of the hearings
about Syria).
139. See The Authorization of the Use of Force in Syria: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On
Foreign Rel., 113th Cong. 38 (2013) (in response to questioning, Secretary of State Kerry
stated that “I know the administration has zero intention of putting troops on the
ground”).
140. Scott Clement, Opposition to Syria Airstrikes Rises as Republicans Shift Sharply
Against Action, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2013/09/09/opposition-to-syria-airstrikes-rises-as-republicans-shift-sharply-
against-action/.
141. By one kind of estimation, some types of Syrian crisis could conceivably take
75,000 American troops on the ground for many months to secure, aid, and protect the
inspection teams supervising a complete disposal of chemical weapons. CHRISTOPHER M.
BLANCHARD & JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43201, POSSIBLE U.S. INTERVEN-
TION IN SYRIA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 21 (2013).
142. Ramsey Cox, Reid Files Resolution to Authorize Force Against Syria, HILL (Sept. 6,
2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/320695-reid-files-use-of-force-reso-
lution-against-syria; Seung Min Kim, Kerry Fumbles “Boots” Question, POLITICO (Sept. 3,
2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/senate-foreign-relations-committee-
debates-syria-096215; Manu Raju & John Bresnahan, Senators Craft Syria Compromise,
POLITICO (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/senators-syria-com-
promise-096234.
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ground combat units.143  The need for congressional authorization is
clearer with respect to ground combat than with air strikes.144  Ground
combat may result in more American casualties, the danger of deepening
involvement, greater need for supporting arms and logistics supply, less
short-term flexibility, and a greater risk of long-term entanglement.145  The
differences between air strikes and ground combat puts a greater burden
on the President to justify proceeding unilaterally with ground combat
troops.  Additionally, congressional proposals may draw a line authorizing
air strikes but not ground combat.146
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out by a slim ten to
seven margin a bipartisan authorization for action against Syria.147  In the
House, the leadership of both parties supported the authorization.148  But
both the House, measured in informal counts, and the public, measured in
polls, were skeptical of or opposed the Administration position.149  The
Washington Post found Congress to be split into five groups: the “ ‘happy to
debate the issue, reserving judgment’ caucus”; the “skeptical caucus”; the
“anti-military action caucus”; the “ ‘do it now, already’ caucus”; and the
“ ‘bigger military action’ caucus.”150
Support seemed likely in the Senate.151  In the House, it could not be
predicted.152  The key seemed to be which way liberal Democrats would
vote.153  Their constituents were torn between their continuing anger and
143. See Ilya Somin, Unconstitutional War Against ISIS Expands to Include Ground Com-
bat by US Forces, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/30/unconstitutional-war-against-isis-expands-to-in
clude-ground-combat-by-us-forces/ (detailing the distinction that Administrations have
made between air strikes and deployment of ground combat units).
144. See id.
145. Alessandria Masi, Does the US Need Ground Forces to Fight ISIS in Iraq, Syria? The
Impact of Airstrikes vs. Combat Troops, IBT (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/
does-us-need-ground-forces-fight-isis-iraq-syria-impact-airstrikes-vs-combat-troops-1690
915.
146. See, e.g., Raju & Bresnahan, supra note 142.
147. Cox, supra note 142; Mark Landler, Jonathan Weisman & Michael R. Gordon,
Split Senate Panel Approves Giving Obama Limited Authority on Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/world/middleeast/divided-senate-panel-
approves-resolution-on-syria-strike.html.
148. Ginger Gibson, Nancy Pelosi’s Test, POLITICO (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.politico
.com/story/2013/09/nancy-pelosi-syria-096224; United States Involvement in Syria, BAL-
LOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_involvement_in_Syria (last visited Oct.
6, 2016).
149. Andrew Dugan, U.S. Support for Action in Syria is Low vs. Past Conflicts, GALLUP
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/164282/support-syria-action-lower-past-
conflicts.aspx; see also Gibson, supra note 148.
150. Ed O’Keefe, The 5 Ways that Congress is Splitting on Syria, WASH. POST (Sept. 1,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/09/01/the-5-ways-
that-congress-is-splitting-on-syria/.
151. See United States Involvement in Syria, supra note 148.
152. See Gibson, supra note 148 (giving contradicting reports of support in the
House).
153. See Jeremy W. Peters, Obama Faces Barrier in His Own Party on Syria, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/world/middleeast/obama-faces-
barrier-in-his-own-party-on-syria.html.
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wariness from the Iraq War, and their general support for President
Obama.154  These representatives did not want to tip their hand until the
last minute to avoid alienating part of their base.155
Then an international solution emerged.  Because it became public on
September 9, 2013, a relatively late date, and because of the way it was
arranged, there was a public misimpression that it was a wildly surprising
and unexpected development.  Later, however, it emerged that there had
been many discussions on the subject between Secretary Kerry and his
Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.156  Vladimir Putin raised it directly
with Obama two days before (September 7th) Kerry took it to the public on
September 9th.157
Kerry made it public in the form of a seemingly offhand comment:
“Sure, [Assad] could turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons to
the international community in the next week.  [B]ut he isn’t about to do it,
and it can’t be done.”158  But his comment was well calculated.159  His
comment was a nuanced signal to the Russians that the United States
would welcome Russian action as an alternative to American air strikes in
Syria.160  Immediately afterward, Kerry had a scheduled conversation with
Lavrov, in which Lavrov said Russia planned to make a public proposal
along Kerry’s lines.161  Russia could prevent American military involve-
ment in the Syrian civil war if Assad, on a Russian leash to assure his keep-
ing his word, “agreed to have his poison gas placed under international
control and ultimately destroyed.”162
Then Vladimir Putin, who had made his eagerness to stake a high-
profile position on Syria clear, vocally made the Kerry/Lavrov proposal his
own.163  He obtained Assad’s assent.164  With Kerry having negotiated, in
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. It was reported that after Assad’s use of poison gas on August 21, 2013, Kerry
and Lavrov spoke nine times.  Peter Baker & Michael R. Gordon, An Unlikely Evolution,
From Casual Proposal to Possible Resolution, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/Syria-An-Unlikely-Evolution.html.
157. Id.
158. Arshad Mohammed & Andrew Osborn, Kerry: Syrian Surrender of Chemical
Arms Could Stop U.S. Attack, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-syria-crisis-kerry-idUSBRE9880BV20130909.
159. Baker & Gordon, supra note 64.
160. David M. Herszenhorn & Michael R. Gordon, Behind Arms Deal, Veteran Diplo-
mat Fond of Cigars, Whiskey and Outfoxing U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/world/middleeast/veteran-diplomat-fond-of-cigars-whiskey-
and-outfoxing-us.html.
161. Observers give Lavrov much credit. See id.
162. See Bill Keller, Opinion, Playing Chess with Putin, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10,
2013), http://keller.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/playing-chess-with-putin/; see also
Michael R. Gordon & Steven Lee Myers, Obama Calls Russia Offer on Syria Possible
‘Breakthrough,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/
world/middleeast/kerry-says-syria-should-hand-over-all-chemical-arms.html.
163. See Michael R. Gordon & Steven Lee Myers, Kerry Insists That Syria Quickly Give
Data on Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/
world/middleeast/united-states-and-russia-far-apart-as-kerry-arrives-in-geneva-for-syria-
talks.html.
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effect on two tracks— with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
with the Russians— President Obama could demonstrate a cautious
embrace of the solution.165  Although a great deal of negotiation and
implementation remained, the deal was struck right then.166
With this background unveiled, it is evident that the international
agreement evolved parallel to, and simultaneously with, the evolution of
the dialogue between the Obama Administration and Congress.  Putin and
Lavrov probably saw, from the time being taken for the process, that there
was still a window for Russia to play a major role.  Obama and Kerry were
making use of the painful lesson about how unwelcome military actions
against Syria were in the eyes of the public and Congress.
C. Does the Dialogue Process Work?
In 2013, when President Obama called for Congress to vote on war
authorization, reluctant members may have defeated him on that vote.
Some commentators have maintained that the President hardly ever loses
in war powers controversies.167  In this view, the President has powers that
overwhelm or outmaneuver the Congress.  The President has the initiative
on whether, where, when, and how to take military action.168  He has the
ability to alarm the public and a monopoly on intelligence resources—
including the ability to deceptively manipulate the content of intelligence
and conceal covert action, thereby shaping public knowledge.169  In addi-
tion, he has the loyal support of his own party, and the opposing party is
usually unwilling to attack the Commander in Chief.170
Yet this time, President Obama may well have lost such a vote.  The
observation that the President hardly ever loses in war powers controver-
sies may apply to some historic periods more than others.  Presidents in
some eras hit more resistance in their foreign initiatives, from the after-
math of World War I to the end of the Vietnam War.171  The Iran-Contra
affair from 1984 to 1986 reflected the Reagan Administration’s resort to
misconduct so that it could provide aid to the Contras in Nicaragua even
164. See id.
165. See Michael D. Shear, Michael R. Gordon & Steven Lee Myers, Obama Backs Idea
for Syria to Cede Control of Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
images/2013/09/10/nytfrontpage/scan.pdf.
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1320 (1988) [hereinafter Koh,
Why the President (Almost) Always Wins].
168. See id. at 1292– 93 n.169 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)).
169. See id. at 1289 (describing, as an example, the conduct of the Reagan administra-
tion during the Iran-Contra Affair).
170. See id. at 1311.
171. The Senate that defeated the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the isolationist Con-
gresses that limited American involvement in the first two years of World War II, and the
Congress barring further involvement in Indochina and enacting the War Powers Reso-
lution in 1974, suggest that the President does sometimes lose. See id. at 1293.
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though Congress barred such aid.172
In 2013, after the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the public and
Congress were suffering from severe war fatigue.173  While the opposition
party in Congress may ordinarily trust a President’s description of Middle
Eastern threats, that willingness to trust was reduced by President Bush’s
action in 2002 and 2003.174  Having been gulled into fearing Saddam Hus-
sein’s non-existent WMD in that earlier era, most Americans did not fear
that Assad’s chemical weapons would threaten the United States.175
Instead, they viewed Assad’s use of chemical weapons as just one more
awful thing Assad did in an awful civil war that the United States should
not get involved in.176
We believe that the correct question to ask is whether the war powers
dialogue between the President and Congress worked in 2013.  The answer
is yes.  Syria gave up its chemical weapons in a way that did not require
combat, casualties, massive expenditures, or a rending of the international
fabric.177
What that outcome did require was that the President not rush ahead
unilaterally with air strikes on Syria.  Had President Obama moved unilat-
erally on air strikes (as both Reagan and Obama did in Libya), there would
not have been the time for the multilateral diplomatic process to work.
Through the process of trying to persuade and listening to Congress,
Obama came to understand that the public and Congress would vastly pre-
fer a diplomatic solution, even one with Russia, over air strikes.178
The democratic and legitimate process that followed Obama’s decision
to seek congressional authorization produced an airing of both the calcula-
tions about Syria’s chemical weapons and the public’s reluctance to get
involved.
III. ISIS from 2014 to the Present: President and Congress Find a
Modus Vivendi
A. Presidential Claim that 2001 and 2002 AUMFs Authorized 2014
Airstrikes
ISIS burst onto the international scene in 2014 by seizing control of
172. See id. at 1302– 03.
173. See Blow, War-Weariness, supra note 104.
174. Robert Bejesky, The SSCI Investigation of the Iraq War: Part II: Politicization of
Intelligence, 40 S.U. L. REV. 243, 279 n.142 (2013) (describing criticisms that the Bush
Administration manipulated the public’s trust).
175. See id. at 245 n.7, 256; see also Mark Thompson, The U.S. Military: Sidelined by a
Fatigued Nation, TIME (May 13, 2014), http://time.com/98310/the-u-s-military-side-
lined-by-a-fatigued-nation/.
176. Blow, War-Weariness, supra note 104.
177. See Last of Syria’s Chemical Weapons Shipped Out, BBC (June 23, 2014), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27974379.
178. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria, WHITE HOUSE (Sept.
10, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-presi-
dent-address-nation-syria.
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territory in Syria and Iraq.179  In early June 2014, ISIS seized Mosul, the
second largest city in Iraq.180  This signaled that Iraqi forces could not
resist ISIS.181  In early August, ISIS forces set out to slaughter a large ethnic
minority in Iraq, the Yazidis.182  President Obama responded, in a national
address, by authorizing air strikes coupled with air drops of humanitarian
supplies.183  In September, the President began explaining to the press his
authority to institute these actions.184  The President’s justifications to
Congress for these actions cited Article II of the Constitution, the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) for al Qaeda and Afghani-
stan, and the 2002 AUMF against Iraq.185  The White House comments to
the press, including background “talking points” explaining legal theories,
went into more detail.186  Secretary of State John Kerry defended the policy
at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.187
Each of these justifications, taken separately, was debated.188  The
Administration argued that in addition to humanitarian concerns, the
scale and operations of ISIS threatened strategic U.S. interests in Iraq.189
But similar arguments could be made about terrorist groups that controlled
territory in other countries, from al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya to Boko
179. Ian Fisher, In Rise of ISIS, No Single Missed Key but Many Strands of Blame, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/middleeast/in-
rise-of-isis-no-single-missed-key-but-many-strands-of-blame.html.
180. Suadad Al-Salhy & Tim Arango, Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/
militants-in-mosul.html.
181. See id. (describing how the Iraqi army “crumbled” in the face of the ISIS attack).
182. See generally Human Rights Council, “They Came to Destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against
the Yazidis, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2 (June 15, 2016).
183. Helene Cooper, Mark Landler & Alissa J. Rubin, Obama Allows Airstrikes Against
Iraq Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2014, at A1, A9.
184. Press Release, White House, Background Conference Call on the President’s
Address to the Nation (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/09/10/background-conference-call-presidents-address-nation.
185. Charlie Savage, White House Invites Congress to Approve ISIS Strikes, but Says It
Isn’t Necessary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2014, at A10; Email from Obama Administration, to
The New York Times (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
1301198-is-; Jack Goldsmith, The Administration Has Violated the War Powers Resolution
Unless It Is Right About the Applicability of the AUMFs to the Islamic State, LAWFARE (Oct.
8, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/administration-has-violated-war-powers-resolu-
tion-unless-it-right-about-applicability-aumfs-islamic; Ryan Lizza, What Is a New War
Authorization Worth?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/new-war-authorization-worth.
186. Email from Obama Administration, supra note 185; Gene Healy, Obama’s Illegal
War on ISIS, NAT’L INT. (Aug. 14, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/obamas-ille-
gal-war-isis-13579.
187. Susan Jones, Kerry: Obama Administration Listening to ‘Good Lawyers’ Rather
Than Congress, CNS NEWS (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/
susan-jones/kerry-obama-administration-listening-good-lawyers-rather-congress.
188. Goldsmith, supra note 185.  For the parallel issue as to Syria, see John Yoo, Like
It or Not, Constitution Allows President to Strike Syria Without Congressional Approval, FOX
NEWS (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/08/30/constitution-
allows-obama-to-strike-syria-without-congressional-approval.html.
189. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraqi Stability and the “ISIS War,” CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUD., Aug. 12, 2005, at 1, 2– 3, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/
legacy_files/files/publication/150812_Iraq_Stability_and_the_War_on_ISIS.pdf.
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Haraam in Nigeria.  It would be a very broad claim for the President to
argue that he could unilaterally make war against any terrorist group he
might feel like, without obtaining any approval from Congress.
The 2001 AUMF seemed stretched to reach ISIS.190  It had been
drafted to reach Afghanistan, not Iraq or Syria some thirteen years later.191
It addressed al Qaeda, which had launched the 9/11 strike.192  But the
lineal descendant of al Qaeda was not ISIS, but al-Nusra.193  Using the
2001 AUMF as authorization for war-fighting in a different country thir-
teen years later against a terrorist group that was not tied to al Qaeda raised
questions about how many countries, and for how many years, the Presi-
dent could engage in war-making.194
The 2002 AUMF served as the basis for the long war by the United
States against the Saddam Hussein regime and, later, the insurgency
against the U.S. occupation, and the United States eventually declared that
it had made peace in Iraq.195  It was a strain to construe an old authoriza-
tion for war against Iraq as authorization for airstrikes or other military
action against Syria.196
In 2014, ISIS beheaded American journalists and posted videos of the
beheadings on the Internet.197  The public had taken these videos as, in
effect, ISIS’s declaration of war on the United States, and deemed presiden-
tial retaliation tit-for-tat.198  The President’s action had broad public
support.199
Mosul’s fall cut the ground out from under the argument that Iraq
could manage ISIS without more help from the American military.200  In
190. Ryan Goodman, White House Relies on 2002 Iraq Authorization— But What’s the
Theory?, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 13, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/14980/white-
house-relies-2002-iraq-authorization-but-whats-theory/; see also Shane, The Presidential
Statutory Stretch, supra note 25, at 1245– 46.
191. Gonzalez, supra note 14, at 163.
192. Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Speech at the Annual Meet-
ing of the American Society of International Law: The Legal Framework for the United
States’ Use of Military Force Since 9/11 (Apr. 10, 2015).
193. Gregory A. Wagner, Warheads on Foreheads: The Applicability of the 9/11 AUMF
to the Threat of ISIL, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 235, 255 (2015); Ray Sanchez & Paul Cruik-
shank, Syria’s al-Nusra rebrands and cuts ties with al Qaeda, CNN (Aug. 1, 2016), http://
www.cnn.com/2016/07/28/middleeast/al-nusra-al-qaeda-split/.
194. Brett LoGliurato & Hunter Walker, Congressman: Obama’s Expansion of His Cam-
paign is ‘Illegal,’ BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-
isis-legal-aumf-congress-2014-9.
195. See Shailagh Murray & Jonathan Weisman, Democrats Seek to Repeal 2002 War
Authorization, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/02/22/AR2007022201743.html (describing how Congress
announced plans to withdraw combat troops in Iraq).
196. Goodman, supra note 190.
197. Elizabeth Schumacher, Islamic State: A Chronology of Key Developments, DW
(Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.dw.com/en/islamic-state-a-chronology-of-key-develop-
ments/a-17920159.
198. Mark Mazetti, Eric Schmitt & Mark Handler, Struggling to Gauge Threat, Even as
U.S. Prepares to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2014 at A1, A8.
199. See id. (detailing public support for action against ISIS).
200. The unchallenged nature of the operation resembled Grenada and Panama in
that the lack of domestic dispute owed to its popularity, rather than to Congressional
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August 2014, President Obama wrote Congress, explaining that the ISIS
threat had grown and required American countermeasures.201  Over time,
the Administration increased the commitment, pursuing air strikes in Syria
and increasing the U.S. military presence in Iraq beyond 3,700 troops on
missions like training and base security, with Special Forces missions in
both countries.202
B. Presidential Invitation to Congress
At a press conference on November 5, 2014, President Obama sig-
naled that he wanted to develop, with congressional leaders, a new AUMF
specifically targeting ISIS in order to “right-size and update whatever
authorization Congress provides to suit the current fight, rather than previ-
ous fights.”203  In other words, he wanted a new AUMF addressing the cur-
rent war with ISIS rather than relying on the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs.204
Congressional hearings occurred on December 9th and 10th, but that
was during a lame duck period before control of the Senate shifted from
the Democratic Party to the Republican Party.205  At the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing on December 9th, Secretary Kerry stated the
Administration’s views that the AUMF should provide flexibility, should
not limit operations to Iraq and Syria, and should not completely preclude
concurrence in virtually ceremonial pronouncements of legal justification. See Al-Salhy
& Arango, supra note 180.
201. Gonzalez, supra note 14, at 149– 50.
202. Dan Lamothe & Loveday Morris, Pentagon Will Send Hundreds More Troops to
Iraq Following Seizure of Key Airfield, WASH. POST (July 11, 2016), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/11/seizure-of-key-air-base-near-mosul-
raises-prospect-of-u-s-escalation-against-isis/; Michael S. Schmidt & Helene Cooper,
More is Needed to Beat ISIS, Pentagon Officials Conclude, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2016), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2016/01/29/world/middleeast/more-is-needed-to-beat-isis-us-mili-
tary-concludes.html.
203. Mark Landler & David E. Sanger, Obama to Seek Congressional Backing for Mili-
tary Campaign Against ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
11/06/world/middleeast/obama-to-seek-congressional-backing-for-military-campaign-
against-isis.html.
204. Id. It is tempting to link this to the result of the November 4th election of a
Republican majority in the Senate, as well as, previously, the House.  However, he had
already raised the point.  Waiting may simply have been to avoid losing the consensus
nature of the issue by injection into the politics of the election itself.  In November, it
could get unveiled, having undergone a short-term postponement, as part of the Presi-
dent having his own agenda, contrasting with Congress’s own, to get the government
moving again after the election. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Jonathan Weisman, Obama
Ready to Authorize Airstrikes on ISIS in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/us/obama-isis-congress.html.
205. Congressional Hearings on an ISIL AUMF, CTR. NAT’L SEC. STUDIES, http://cnss
.org/pages/congressional-hearings-on-an-isil-aumf.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).  The
prior Congress had a Republican-majority House and a Democratic-majority Senate.
The new Congress starting in 2015 would have a Republican-majority House and a
Republican-majority Senate.  The Republicans would not want war authority to be
resolved by a Democratic-majority Senate when it could instead be left for a Republican-
majority Senate starting in 2015.  Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Riding Wave of
Discontent, G.O.P Takes Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/11/05/us/politics/midterm-elections.html.
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a role for ground combat forces.206  The Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee reported out a new authorization with a three-year sunset and heavy
restrictions on the use of ground forces.207
President Obama mentioned the issue during his State of the Union
Address in 2015.208  To clarify his position, President Obama provided a
draft proposal for a new AUMF in February of 2015.209
The President’s invitation is an unusual stance and action in war pow-
ers.  To be sure, Presidents have asked Congress for support or war-fighting
authorization in the past.  However, generally, these requests have fallen
into two categories.  Some, like the area support resolutions in the 1950s,
were pro forma requests for non-controversial support that received com-
prehensive Congressional approval.  More importantly, others were genu-
ine authorizations of war overcoming some legislative resistance, like the
arming of merchant ships on the eve of American involvement in World
War I or the Persian Gulf War of 1991.210
Although the public accepted air strikes on ISIS, the resolution sought
here was not an entirely non-controversial statement of support.  Nor was it
a declaration of a new full-scale war.  By this point, the United States had
engaged in air strikes and other activities for many months using asserted
authority from Article II and the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, and was virtually
unchallenged in domestic politics.211
206. Jeremy W. Peters & Michael R. Gordon, Kerry Warns Senate Against Curbs on
Fighting ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/us/
politics/kerry-warns-senate-against-curbs-on-fighting-isis.html.
207. Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Panel Approves Limited Fight Against ISIS, Reopening War
Powers Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/us/
politics/senate-panel-approves-limited-fight-against-isis-reopening-war-powers-debate
.html.
208. Wagner, supra note 193, at 260.
209. President Barack Obama, Letter from the President –  Authorization for the Use of
United States Armed Forces in connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/
11/letter-president-authorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-connection; see also
Geoff Dyer, Obama Asks Congress to Back War on Isis, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2015), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/61c039b8-b208-11e4-b380-00144feab7de.html#axzz4JJ1727Ty
(noting that the proposal was the first time since 2002 that a President had asked Con-
gress to “vote on the fight against Jihadi terrorists”).
210. See, e.g., JOHN F. KENNEDY, George Norris, in PROFILES IN COURAGE (1956); see also
Sara Fritz & William J. Eaton, Congress Authorizes Gulf War: Historic Act: The Vote in
Both Houses, Supporting Bush and Freeing Troops to Attack Iraq, is Decisive and Bipartisan.
It Is the Strongest Move Since Tonkin Gulf, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 1991), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/1991-01-13/news/mn-374_1_persian-gulf.
211. Jack Goldsmith, The Obama Administration’s Legal Justification for Strikes
Against the Islamic State in Syria, LAWFARE (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog
.com/obama-administrations-legal-justification-strikes-against-islamic-state-syria; Char-
lie Savage, Obama Sees Iraq Resolution as a Legal Basis for Airstrikes, Official Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/americas/obama-
sees-iraq-resolution-as-a-legal-basis-for-airstrikes-official-says.html; see Cristina Marcos,
House Kills Measure to Force Debate on Military Force Against ISIS, HILL (June 11, 2015),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/244704-house-kills-vote-to-force-debate-on-
authorizing-troops-against-isis (suggesting that Congress is not particularly motivated to
move away from the Obama Administration’s employment of the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs
as justification for the airstrikes against ISIS).
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Earlier Presidents had gotten away with claims of unilateral Article II
authority for military operations, but those were generally short-term oper-
ations, such as the invasions of Grenada and Panama and airstrikes in Bos-
nia and Libya.212  The military action against ISIS would become a long-
term operation, and the President’s invitation to Congress could be seen as
an attempt to bolster his previously asserted Article II authority with statu-
tory support.213
Over the long term, something questionable or controversial would
likely occur in the war.  If the public mood were to shift strongly against
the war with ISIS, the President’s tenuous claim of authority without a
fresh congressional enactment might cause the war’s unpopularity to fall
only on the President.214  Congressional critics could attack the President
for failing to seek congressional authorization.215  It would be more diffi-
cult for members of Congress to criticize the President’s war-making
choices if they were on the record as authorizing the war.  Those potential
critics likely preferred not to take a public position on whether they
wanted a more limited, or a more vigorous, intervention.
President Obama’s invitation shows a striking acceptance that Con-
gress has a necessary role in saying yea or nay to war-fighting.  Obama’s
invitation contrasts sharply with the efforts of prior Presidents to minimize
Congress’s role.  Since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution over
President Nixon’s veto in 1973, Presidents have consistently taken the posi-
tion that it was unconstitutional.216  President Obama’s refusal to acknowl-
edge that the 2011 Libya air strikes were “hostilities” reflected that
struggle.217  The previous President, President Bush, vetoed Congress’s
212. Office of Legal Counsel, Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into
Bosnia, 19 OPINIONS OFF. LEGAL COUNS. 327, 327 (1995); Eric Posner, Opinion, Obama
Can Bomb Pretty Much Anything He Wants To, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/09/war_against_isis_in_syr
ia_obama_s_legal_and_political_justifications.html.
213. See Jack Goldsmith, Opinion, Why President Obama Should Seek Formal Congres-
sional Support If He Ramps Up Force Against the Islamic State After Paris, LAWFARE (Nov.
14, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-president-obama-should-seek-formal-con-
gressional-support-if-he-ramps-force-against-islamic-state.
214. Vice President Biden acknowledged this dynamic when he explained President
Obama’s decision to seek authorization from Congress in connection with Syria.
It matters to have Congress with you, in terms of your ability to sustain what
you set out to do,” he said. Obama “knew that if he was going to do anything, he
better damn well have the public with him, or it would be a very short ride.  . . .
You need the support of the American people.
Goldberg, supra note 112.
215. Peter Baker & Ashley Parker, Congress Shows a Lack of Enthusiasm for Giving
Obama War Powers to Fight ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/13/us/congress-shows-a-lack-of-enthusiasm-for-giving-obama-war-powers-to-
fight-isis.html.
216. Damrosch, supra note 118, at 127.
217. Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in
Libya Operation, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/
politics/16powers.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-3\CIN304.txt unknown Seq: 28  6-APR-17 16:16
710 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
effort in 2007 to stop the Iraq War.218  Congress enacted war-ending provi-
sions in a supplemental appropriations bill, which Bush vetoed and won
the override fight on— a vivid battle between the branches.219  Going fur-
ther back, in 1999, Congress denied President Clinton a clear authoriza-
tion for his Serbian war, although the supportive votes on different
propositions in each chamber were arguably akin to partial support.220
President Obama’s invitation stood out against the background of that
struggle.
The presidential invitation to Congress operated in many ways to
adjust the climate of war powers.221  It replaced struggle between the
branches with trust that Congress would act in the national interest.222  It
pushed aside the apparent need for a President to claim expansive Article II
powers, instead turning to Article I.223  Finally, it reflected a willingness to
accept Congress’s tendency to put conditions or limits on grants of
authority.
The invitation created a precedent for the rest of the Obama years and
for future Presidents because a Democratic President made concessions to
a Republican Congress.224  This resembled the way that President Bush in
late 1990 asked a Democratic Congress to authorize the Persian Gulf War,
and, after a robust congressional debate, obtained authorization in January
1991, with a close Senate vote of fifty-two to forty-seven.225  Presidents
Bush and Obama demonstrated that a President may seek and accept the
authorization votes from a Congress controlled by the opposition party.
C. Congress Skeptical About Acting
In the wake of President Obama’s invitation, the Republican-con-
trolled Congress did give some consideration to the issue.226  However, as
the New York Times put it, “President Obama’s formal request for congres-
sional authorization to fight the Islamic State— once framed by lawmakers
as a matter of great constitutional import— is now seriously imperiled
because Republicans think it does too little and Democrats think it does
218. Charles Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President Step Up a War?, 71 LA. L. REV. 391,
441– 42 (2011) [hereinafter Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President].
219. Id.
220. GRIMMETT, supra note 82, at 4– 5.
221. See Wagner, supra note 193, at 259– 60 (describing President Obama’s goal to
unify the branches in the face of war).
222. See id. (describing President Obama’s goal to unify the branches and the impor-
tance of the proposed legislation).
223. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 205, 207 (2007).
224. See Eric Pianin, Why Congress Is Neglecting the War on ISIS, FISCAL TIMES (Aug. 6,
2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/08/06/Why-Congress-Neglecting-War-ISIS
(describing the interactions between President Obama and the Republican Congress).
225. CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S
STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 130– 33 (Westview Press 1994).
226. See generally Peters & Gordon, supra note 206.
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too much.”227
The “dovish” side objected to the Administration’s proposal because it
did not rule out ground combat operations.228  Rather, it ruled out “endur-
ing offensive ground combat operations.”229  In theory, this limit would
avoid what took place in Iraq and Afghanistan, namely, a long-term offen-
sive operation with American ground combat forces conducting most, and
sometimes all, of the war.230  But these are not well-established terms of
art.  The Administration would impose its interpretation of these terms,
which could be used as large loopholes.231
The White House press release accompanying the proposal laid out a
list of examples in which the President could employ ground troops: “res-
cue operations,” “the use of special operations forces to take military
action against ISIL leadership,” and “intelligence collection and sharing,
missions to enable kinetic strikes, or the provision of operational planning
and other forms of advice and assistance to partner forces.”232  The
Administration seemed to suggest that American forces could do what they
wanted short of combat units carrying out full-scale offensives.233
The “hawkish” side had its own objections, doubting that the Adminis-
tration strategy would bring victory.234  There was no consensus among
these critics about what the United States should do, or what to include in
an authorizing resolution.235  This in itself raised an important war powers
issue.  It is far from clear whether Congress can make a President step up a
war.236  Had Congress passed an authorizing resolution directing offensive
ground operations against ISIS in Syria, President Obama could have
invoked his Article II powers, argued that Congress could not compel him,
against his will, to engage in war-fighting, and deemed such a resolution as
merely giving him the discretion to conduct a war.
Members of Congress held diverse views.237  In any event, as the
months went by and the first anniversary of U.S. involvement came and
227. Ashley Parker, Impasse with Congress Imperils Authorization to Combat ISIS, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/politics/a-rift-imper-
ils-authorization-to-combat-isis.html?_r=0.
228. Peters & Gordon, supra note 206.
229. Kristina Wong, Kerry Talk Deepens Dem Unease on ISIS War Powers, HILL (Feb.
27, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/234046-afghan-war-powers-how-long-is-
enduring (emphasis added).
230. Obama, supra note 209.
231. Wong, supra note 229.
232. Wagner, supra note 193, at 267.
233. See id.
234. The hopes for the Iraqi forces to retake Mosul faded.  ISIS took other cities, nota-
bly Ramadi.  American training seemed unable to stand up the Iraqi army.  Shiite mili-
tias could do some fighting against ISIS, but they alienated the Iraqi Sunni community.
Robert Burns, US Strategy in Question After Iraq’s Stalemate in Ramadi, BUS. INSIDER
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-us-strategy-in-question-after-iraqs-
stalemate-in-ramadi-2015-9.
235. See Peters & Gordon, supra note 206 (detailing such debates).
236. Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President, supra note 218, at 448.
237. See KENNETH KATZMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43612, THE “ISLAMIC
STATE” CRISIS AND POLICY 28– 31 (2015).
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went, Congress still did not act, for reasons beyond those involved in alter-
native drafts of the authorization.238  Although there were partisan differ-
ences about what to say in the authorization, Senators Tim Kaine (D-Va.)
and Jeff Flake (R-Ar.) developed a bipartisan draft in June 2015, but it went
nowhere.239
In January 2016, the Senate Republican Majority Leader, Senator
McConnell, set the stage for Senate consideration of an authorization for
the war with ISIS.240  The House and Senate continued to consider biparti-
san action in 2016.241  Still, Republicans did not see the advantage in a
vote.242  At the time, it seemed necessary for the American effort to con-
tinue.  Since President Obama lacked fresh congressional authorization, he
continued to assert that Congress authorized the current military actions
when it passed the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs.  Republicans were likely to be
glad not to have their fingerprints on an authorization, giving them a clear
field to blame Obama for a failed strategy.243
In terms of war powers, this brought up a new variation on an old
issue: does Article I give Congress constitutional duties along with the con-
stitutional powers it provided?244  Congress chose to keep itself on the
sidelines even though the President invited it to act.245  Would Congress
find itself vulnerable to criticism for failing to vote on a war question, and
for dereliction of its constitutional duty?  Although some Members tried to
get such a vote, the desire not to commit seemed bipartisan and bicam-
238. See Jennifer Bendery, One Year In, Congress Still Hasn’t Authorized the War Against
Isis, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/congress-
aumf-isis_us_55c2482be4b0138b0bf4bca4; Eric Pianin, Why Congress Is Neglecting the
War on ISIS, FISCAL TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/08/06/
Why-Congress-Neglecting-War-ISIS.
239. Eric Pianin, Congress Lets Obama Go It Alone to Fight ISIS, FISCAL TIMES (Apr. 23,
2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/04/23/Congress-Lets-Obama-Go-It-Alone-
Fight-ISIS; Josh Rogin, Islamic State War Authorization Goes Nowhere, Again, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (June 9, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-09/islamic-
state-war-authorization-goes-nowhere-again.
240. Herszenhorn, supra note 4.
241. Preliminary steps were taken, but no authorization bill actually was voted up or
down by the two chambers of Congress.  Demirjian, supra note 4; Herszenhorn, supra
note 4; Poplin, supra note 4.
242. Peter Beinart, Why Won’t the GOP Declare War on ISIS?, ATLANTIC (May 28,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/congress-aumf-isis-war/
394268.
243. Douglas L. Kriner, Obama’s Authorization Paradox: Syria and Congress’s Contin-
ued Relevance in Military Affairs, 44 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 309, 323 (2014) (arguing that
members who oppose authorizations are much more likely to criticize the resulting war
than members who vote for the authorization); Beinart, supra note 242.
244. See Peter D. Coffman, Power and Duty: The Language of the War Power, 80 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1236, 1246– 48, 1262– 63 (1995) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)).
245. Bruce Ackerman, Can the Supreme Court Force Congress to Own the War on ISIS?,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/sup
reme-court-and-isis/402155.
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eral.246  It is extraordinary that Congress would stay silent on whether to
authorize war, especially when the party opposite the President controls
both chambers.
IV. How the War Powers Process Worked Democratically and
Legitimately
The tradition in studying war powers is to focus on whether the Presi-
dent had sufficient authority for the war powers action he has taken.247
Put baldly, the question is whether the President or, alternatively, the Con-
gress, prevailed.  The pro-executive side insists that the President may exer-
cise war powers without formal congressional authorization— thus, the
President “wins.”  For example, President Reagan “won” by invading Gre-
nada, and President George H.W. Bush “won” by invading Panama.248
Some think the President almost always wins.249
The pro-Congress side urges that when Congress insists on a meaning-
ful authorization vote and obtains a relatively honest exposition from the
President about what is going on and what he wants to do, Congress
“wins.”  For example, when President George H.W. Bush sought and
obtained congressional authorization before invading Iraq in the first Per-
sian Gulf War, Congress “won.”250  And when President Obama (along
with NATO allies) imposed a no-fly zone on Libya in 2011 without specific
congressional authorization, Congress “lost.”251
The approach advocated for in this Article gives limited attention to
the question of whether the President had formal authorization for military
actions.  Instead, this Article re-focuses the attention on the nature of the
interaction between the President and Congress prior to any military
action, examining whether the outcome is democratic and legitimate.
A purely formal and binary analysis of the Syrian episode in 2013
would suggest that the President “lost.”252  Some traditional pro-executive
critics would denigrate President Obama for his failure to assert unilateral
executive authority.  He started out asserting the power to make war deci-
sions on his own, but then “backed down” and went to Congress.253  Those
who value unilateral Presidential power would classify this episode as a
Presidential “loss.”254
246. Bendery, supra note 238; Matt Fuller, Why Won’t Congress Declare War on ISIS?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/congress-isis-
war_us_566f47cae4b0fccee16f938b.
247. See, e.g., Coffman, supra note 244.
248. Michael N. Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 COR-
NELL L. REV. 695, 703 (1997) (discussing Reagan’s authorization of war in Grenada, and
President Bush’s authorization of war in Panama).
249. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins, supra note 167.
250. See Treanor, supra note 248, at 703.
251. For criticism, see Delahunty, supra note 90. See also S.C. Res. 1973 ¶¶ 6– 12
(Mar. 17, 2011).
252. See Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 93.
253. Id.
254. Burgin, supra note 77, at 214– 15; Kriner, supra note 243, at 314.
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Instead of merely classifying war powers battles as presidential or con-
gressional “wins” or “losses,” the approach taken in this Article examines
the process of the interaction between the branches.  In 2013, Syrian Presi-
dent Assad’s use of chemical weapons against Syrian citizens created a
novel challenge for U.S. policymakers.255  The American public and Con-
gress were split on how to respond.256  Should the United States steer clear
of the Syrian conflict despite Assad’s use of chemical weapons?257
Facing this, President Obama and Congress consulted relatively
closely.258  In the past, Presidents have given lip service to consulting with-
out any sign they paid heed.259  This time, President Obama sought a con-
gressional vote in part because the Speaker of the House, John Boehner,
advised putting it to a congressional vote, and promised to provide an
opportunity for a vote on a straightforward basis.260  This action was not
knee-jerk or ideological on either side.  The two leaders attempted to craft a
legislative process so that the outcome would have democratic
legitimacy.261
The President and congressional leaders sought full congressional
consideration, including congressional hearings.262  Those hearings and
the press coverage brought out the public’s preferences concerning the
issue.263  This was not a matter of a simple partisan split.  Both parties
split internally.264  In both parties, the party leaders backed President
Obama, while many of the rank-and-file did not.265  The swing undeclared
255. See Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 93.
256. Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Airstrikes, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.people-press.org/2013/09/03/public-opinion-runs-against-syrian-air
strikes/.
257. Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 93.
258. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President (Aug. 28,
2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/28/statement-president;
Ashley Parker, Legislators Push for Vote Before Strike, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2013). http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/world/middleeast/legislators-push-for-vote-before-
strike.html.
259. For example, President Reagan disastrously sent Marines into Lebanon in 1983,
without consulting with Congressional leaders who would have warned him that it was
no place for ground troops.  Ford, supra note 30, at 638.
260. Deidre Walsh, Boehner Might Bring Congress Back for Syria Debate After All, CNN
(Sept. 30, 2014, 8:57 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/29/politics/john-boehner-
mixed-messages/.
261. See Press Release, supra note 258; Walsh, supra note 260.
262. Letter from John Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to President
Barack Obama (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/boehner-seeks-
answers-president-obama-syria; Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President in Address to the Nation on Syria (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria.
263. See Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Airstrikes, supra note 256 (describing
public opinion on Syrian airstrikes).
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bloc consisted of House Democrats from anti-war districts.266
There are different ways to view the final outcome, with Russia broker-
ing a deal under which Syria surrendered— and international authorities
destroyed— Syria’s chemical weapons, avoiding any U.S. military action.267
Commentators who favor unilateral executive power would say that Presi-
dent Obama “lost” because he unnecessarily sought congressional authori-
zation, risked defeat at the hands of Congress, and was bailed out by the
Russians.268
A process analysis, however, reveals a legitimate and democratic pro-
cess through which the political branches deliberated on, and came to a
successful resolution on, the possible exercise of war powers.269  There was
robust interaction between the President and Congress on the issue, and
the resulting decision reflected the democratic will.
The war powers process can move fast, as with the near instant con-
gressional responses to the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 and to the 9/11
attack in 2001.270  The process can also move slowly, delaying a rush to
war.  The Syrian chemical weapons incident demonstrates that in the
absence of an attack, the President and Congress can take the time to eval-
uate, consult, debate, and consider options, producing a democratic and
legitimate outcome.
Slowing down executive action allows time for other steps, which can
avoid the need for war.  Two diverse examples illustrate this phenomenon.
— In 1915, while World War I was raging on the European continent,
but before the United States entered the war, a German submarine sank the
Lusitania.271  President Wilson may have considered war, but Congress was
not yet unified in favor of war, and the President sent diplomatic warnings to
Germany.272  Germany agreed to back away from unrestricted submarine
warfare, which it did until 1917, where its actions ultimately brought the
266. This bloc was torn between their support for Obama’s concern for humanitarian
considerations, on the one hand, and their antagonism, intensified after the Iraq War, to
the United States getting into another war, especially another civil war in that region.
See Dana Bash, Obama Officials Try to Sway House Democrats on Syria, CNN (Sept. 2,
2013), politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/02/obama-officials-try-to-sway-house-
democrats-on-syria/; Deirdre Walsh, House Dems Proving a Tough Sell for Obama on
Syria, CNN (Sept. 5, 2013), www.cnn.com/2013/09/05/politics/syria-democrats/.
267. Michael Gordon, U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/
syria-talks.html.
268. Id.  For examples of presidents taking unilateral action, thus “winning,” as
opposed to seeking congressional approval, thus “losing,” see Koh, Why the President
(Almost) Always Wins, supra note 167, at 1261– 73.
269. See ZEISBERG, supra note 135, at 38 (describing “processual standards” for the
exercise of war powers).
270. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (passed 7 days after 9/11); Frank Kluckhohn, U.S. Declares War, Pacific Battle
Widens; Manila Area Bombed; 1,500 Dead in Hawaii, Hostile Planes Sighted at San Fran-
cisco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec 8, 1941, at A1.
271. Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573,
1640 (2011).
272. Id. at 1641.
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United States into the war.273  The U.S. entry into the war was postponed
for two years, allowing the country to become more unified before joining
the terrible conflict.274
— During the Korean War, General MacArthur wanted a wildly aggres-
sive strategy, including the threat to use bombs against China.275  Congress
was incensed at China for its assault on U.S. troops in Korea, and MacArthur
was popular among members of Congress.276  Even so, Congress held a
series of high-level, closed-door hearings about our strategy in Korea, and
President Truman’s military chiefs explained that MacArthur’s approach
could lead to a wider war, including the possibility of World War III.277
Those hearings discredited the MacArthur approach.278
These examples and the 2013 Syrian chemical weapons episode high-
light the important role that congressional debates and hearings on war
powers issues can play.  During the short but intense period between
Obama asking for congressional authority and Russia brokering Syria’s
surrender of chemical weapons, congressional hearings played an impor-
tant role in the ultimately successful process.  The hearings aired a wide
range of views and considerations.  They gave the public a window into the
executive branch, and gave executive and legislative leaders a way to inform
the public and ascertain the public’s ultimate (and better informed) views.
Senate hearings, in particular the positions staked out by some Senators,
convinced Secretary Kerry to disavow the use of regular U.S. ground com-
bat units in Syria.279
As for the ISIS fighting from 2014 on, President Obama was criticized
for proceeding without fresh formal authorization.280  In this view, Presi-
dent Obama improperly attempted to stretch the authority granted under
the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs to justify military action against ISIS.281
273. Id. at 1642– 43.
274. Id.
275. See Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President, supra note 218, at 433.
276. Cody K. Carlson, This Week in History: China Enters the Korean War, DESERET
NEWS (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865616489/This-week-in-
history-China-enters-the-Korean-War.html?pg=all; see Mark Perry, Rethinking Douglas
MacArthur, POLITICO (May 25, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/
05/rethinking-douglas-macarthur-106397 (noting that MacArthur was “so popular that
mothers named their children for him”).
277. Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President, supra note 218, at 433; see H.W. Brands,
The Redacted Testimony that Fully Explains Why General MacArthur Was Fired, SMITHSO-
NIAN MAG. (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/redacted-testi-
mony-fully-explains-why-general-macarthur-was-fired-180960622/ (noting that at these
hearings, the Joint Chiefs of staff opined that MacArthur’s approach would “involve us
in the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy”).
278. Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President, supra note 218, at 433– 34.
279. John Kerry, supra note 6.
280. See Gonzalez, supra note 14, at 163.
281. Id. The 9/11 resolution was over a decade old and had always been directed at al
Qaeda; from a time and cause that long preceded the very existence of ISIS.  It did not
help that, years before, Obama himself had considered that 2001 9/11 measure as better
repealed.  Derek Tsang, To Justify ISIS Airstrikes, Obama Using Legislation He Wants
Repealed, POLITIFACT (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/state-
ments/2014/sep/18/julie-pace/justify-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-obama-usi/.
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President Obama was attempting to have it both ways.  He asserted
that he already had enough authority under those two AUMFs without fur-
ther congressional action, but also sought explicit congressional authoriza-
tion for action against ISIS.  Lawyers are used to “arguing in the
alternative,” but from a pro-congressional perspective, President Obama
did not actually defer to Congress because he initially took action without
seeking explicit congressional authorization.
Rather than scoring the wins and losses of Congress and the Presi-
dent, let’s focus on the process that occurred beginning in 2014.  President
Obama found a way to exercise necessary war authority without riding
roughshod over the separation of powers.  He made an effort to honor Con-
gress’s view— if Congress expressed a view.  Obama had taken a stepwise
effort to get Congress’s attention, giving it plenty of time to take up the
matter, hold hearings, caucus, deliberate, and hold floor votes.
President Obama did not commit to end military engagement against
ISIS even in the event that Congress formally rejected his request.282  More-
over, starting in late 2015, he unilaterally authorized the deployment of
Special Forces missions in Syria.283  But by formally making his authoriza-
tion request to Congress, he gave the impression that he would act in accor-
dance with Congress’s wishes.  By basing his own action on the 2001
authorization, Obama set the stage to accept that as a reason to reduce
American involvement in the event that Congress repealed or limited the
2001 authorization.284
Conversely, Congress had ample room— if it chose— to ask for a ratch-
eted-up war effort.  The President passed the ball to Congress and gave it
room to decide its role.  From the beginning of 2015 until 2016, Congress
has so far decided not to decide.285
With regard to the ISIS conflict starting in 2014, the President’s inter-
actions with Congress constitute a novel process to address a complex war
powers situation.  This is a situation where all relevant actors— the Presi-
dent, the Congress, and the public— are highly ambivalent.286  Few want to
get dragged into a land war in Syria.287  Even fewer want the United States
to lose more lives and treasure on top of so much already lost in that
region.  No one had a strategy that could definitively promise complete
282. Baker & Parker, supra note 215.
283. Syria Conflict: Obama To Send Special Forces To Fight ISIS, BBC (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34681648.
284. MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43983, 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR
USE OF MILITARY FORCE: ISSUES CONCERNING ITS CONTINUED APPLICATION 2, 7 (2015).
285. Jack Goldsmith, Why the AUMF for the Islamic State Has Stalled, LAWFARE (Mar.
20, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-aumf-islamic-state-has-stalled; Ryan
Lucas, Common Defense: A Silent Majority in Congress on War, CQ MAG. (Nov. 9, 2015),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport114-0000047863
05.
286. Uri Friedman, No One’s War, ATLANTIC (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic
.com/international/archive/2015/01/obama-war-isis-state-of-the-union/384700/.
287. John Kerry, supra note 6 (“We all agree there will be not American boots on the
ground.”); Peters & Gordon, supra note 206.
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victory at an acceptable cost.288
At the same time, no one wanted ISIS to flourish and become an estab-
lished and financially sustainable terrorist nation by taking over Iraq and
its enormous oil reserves.  ISIS does not merely engage in terrorism, but is
also ruthless in its hatred for the West.289  It could not be left to occupy
Iraq.  When ISIS took Mosul, and temporarily Ramadi, it demonstrated
that it could defeat the Iraqi National Army.  The doves in Congress natu-
rally had many criticisms of Obama’s ISIS policy, but even they did not
seriously suggest letting ISIS occupy all of Iraq, when there was not even a
firm opposition bloc in Congress against air strikes.290
Congress, for its part, did not falsely accuse the President of usurping
authority and overplaying his hand.  The decision not to have a conclusive
congressional vote on the matter was not made by the President or even by
the President’s own political party.  It was the Republican congressional
leadership that made that decision, which seemed to reflect a general con-
sensus in Congress.  Many members in both parties simply preferred not
to put their fingerprints on a decision when they did not support an alter-
native to the President’s stance.291
To be sure, critics said the President did not have a winning strategy
for resolving the conflict.292  But Congress had not articulated an alterna-
tive strategy.293  The public, too, did not strongly back the President’s
stance, but also did not support an alternative strategy.294  The President
and Congress found a democratic and legitimate path for an ambivalent
country to follow.
V. New and Positive Developments in Domestic War Powers Debates
Much of the scholarship on war powers focuses on “formal” actions
taken by the executive, legislative, or judicial branch.  These actions may
288. The only local force that could fight ISIS (putting aside the Kurds, who were not
national in size) consisted of Shia militia.  These were closely tied to Iran, and hated and
feared by Iraqi Sunnis.  A war by the United States with regular ground combat units
could repeat the sectarian strife of 2003– 2007.  Hugh Naylor & Mustafa Salim, In Fight-




289. Jim Muir, Islamic State Group: The Full Story, BBC (June 20, 2016), http://www
.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35695648.
290. Leigh Ann Caldwell, As Obama Prepares for ISIS Fight, Where Are the Doves?,
CNN (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/obama-isis-doves/.
291. See Russell Berman, The War Against ISIS Will Go Undeclared, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-war-against-isis-will-
go-undeclared/390618/.  On the one hand, Democrats knew that a “yes” vote in support
of the Iraq War in Iraq had not looked so good later on.  On the other hand, Congress-
members either knew, or understood without knowing, that a “no” vote for the 1990 Iraq
had not looked so good later on.  It was dangerous to make a commitment either way on
controversial wars.
292. Baker & Weisman, supra note 111.
293. See Berman, supra note 291.
294. Baker & Weisman, supra note 111.
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include a President’s initiation of military action, congressional authoriza-
tions and appropriations, the occasional judicial opinion, and even those
of international organs, such as UN Security Council resolutions.295  In
addition to the few contemporary court cases addressing war authorization
disputes between the President and Congress, scholars also examine the
Justice Department’s legal opinions addressing presidential authority, such
as the Justice Department opinion on the Libyan no-fly zone of 2011.296
This Article takes a different approach, focusing less on formal author-
ity and more on the process through which Congress and the President
interact in the run-up to the exercise of war powers.  Formal questions of
authority do matter.297  But an under-examined aspect of the war powers
debate is this interactive inter-branch process.  The steps, stances, and
actions of participants are expressed in many ways that do not necessarily
produce formal legal instruments.  What is most interesting in the contem-
porary development of war powers is the evolution of how politico-legal
institutions interact in the run-up to war.
In this regard, for the 2013– 2016 time frame, one of the most striking
aspects has been how the President twice invited Congress to enact explicit
authorization for military action.  The first invitation, regarding Syrian use
of chemical weapons, stunned observers who had taken it for granted that
Presidents decide on war unilaterally.298  Later, President Obama invited
Congress to enact explicit authorization for military action against ISIS.299
He was prepared to deem U.S. involvement to be authorized in the conflict
in any case, but there was no serious doubt as to the sincerity of the
invitation.300
As a matter of formality, there is no obvious textual predicate or his-
torical precedent for such an invitation (in contrast to the requirement that
the President submit his proposed treaties and nominations to Senate for
ratification and confirmation).301  The constitutional text does not say
anything about invitations in the Declaration of War Clause or the Com-
mander in Chief Clause.302  In the nineteenth century, two wars, the War
of 1812 and the Spanish American War of 1898, were largely instigated by
the hawks in Congress rather than the President (Madison and McKin-
295. Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L.J. 1626, 1626,
1629, 1631 (2014).
296. See, e.g., Arthur H. Garrison, The History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions on
the Power of the President as Commander-in-Chief from Washington to Obama, 43 CUMB. L.
REV. 375, 468 (2013).
297. Robert S. Summers, How Law is Formal and Why It Matters, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
1165, 1204– 07 (1997).
298. See Baker & Weisman, supra note 111 (describing the invitation as “one of the
riskiest gambles of [Obama’s] presidency”).
299. See Berman, supra note 291.
300. Id.
301. Joe Barnes, Obama’s AUMF Is Largely Meaningless, But a Good Idea Anyway, HILL
(Feb. 25, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/233747-obamas-aumf-
is-largely-meaningless-but-a-good-idea-anyway (noting that the invitation “marks pro-
gress” in the war powers struggle between Congress and the President).
302. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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ley).303  In the twentieth century, Congress attempted to end or block mili-
tary conflict several times, such as during the end of the Indochina War in
1974 and the Boland Amendments of 1984– 1986, with Presidents vehe-
mently objecting.304
In the contemporary period, Presidents have sought congressional
authorization for ground combat wars, such as the invasions of Iraq in
1991 and 2003.305  For military interventions that consist of air strikes
rather than ground combat, however, the pattern of congressional partici-
pation is not as consistent.  This historical record does not mean that Presi-
dents may unilaterally conduct air strikes.306  But President Obama’s
decisions to invite congressional authorization to authorize air strikes
against Syria in 2013 and against ISIS since 2014 stands out vividly as a
major development in war powers debates.
Another important development is the focus on the specific wording of
war authorization legislation.307  The Obama Administration argued that
its actions against ISIS were authorized by the 2001 AUMF, interpreting it
as authorizing action against ISIS because ISIS allegedly inherited the man-
tle of al Qaeda.308
For many, this broad interpretation of the 2001 AUMF raised hackles.
A broad interpretation of the 2001 AUMF was inconsistent with the infor-
mal but decisive backroom drafting of that AUMF.  Senate Democratic
leaders personally intervened in the week between the September 11, 2001
attacks and the September 18, 2001 passage of the AUMF to tighten up the
draft sent over by the White House.309  In particular, they deleted language
that would have applied to terrorists unconnected to 9/11.310  The
backroom negotiations regarding the 9/11 resolution— and the later signifi-
cance of that specific language as applied to ISIS— are a classic example of
the war powers dialogue.
In any event, putting aside that aspect of the enacted 2001 AUMF,
there is a functional significance in the drafting of mere proposals.  In the
end, Congress did not enact an authorization in connection with Syria in
303. Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President, supra note 218, at 410.
304. Id. at 414.
305. Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 62, at 458.
306. President Obama was criticized for continuing the 2011 Libyan air strikes
beyond the statutory sixty-day period of the War Powers Resolution for “hostilities.”
Charlie Savage, Attack Renews Debate Over Congressional Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21,
2011), http://nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/Africa/22powers.html; Savage & Land-
ler, supra note 217.
307. See Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President, supra note 218, at 408– 09 (discussing
the long-standing Supreme Court law establishing the meaningfulness of limitations in
war authorizations).  The wording of war authorizations has the full indicia of formal
potency— judicial opinions, and, inscription on the formal instrument by which Con-
gress authorizes war.
308. Savage, supra note 185.
309. See CHARLES TIEFER, VEERING RIGHT: HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SUBVERTS THE
LAW FOR CONSERVATIVE CAUSES 258– 59 (University of California Press 2004).
310. See id.
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2013 and has not enacted one in connection with ISIS since 2014.311
From a formal perspective, nothing happened.  But during both periods,
Congress considered and rejected proposed authorizations.312  It was clear
that congressional consideration of those proposals focused on whether to
prohibit regular units of ground combat troops.  Congress’s consideration
and rejection of the proposals suggest— even without formal enactment—
that Congress meant to bar such units, and that President Obama should
listen.
Take the converse proposition.  One could argue that Congress simply
decides whether to go to war and nothing else.  According to the expansive
view of presidential power, it is up to the President to decide how to use
military forces to conduct the fighting.313  But as a pragmatic matter of
domestic politics, that view does not explain the events of the 2013– 2016
time period.  Both the President and Congress expect congressional con-
sideration of proposals to decide the matter, particularly when Congress
expresses strong resistance to ground combat operations.  The Com-
mander-in-Chief takes such congressional views as defining the limits of
his mandate.314
Thirdly, a process-oriented view highlights the importance of using
congressional hearings to uncover executive information, executive inten-
tions, and possible executive distortion of intelligence.  To look only at the
binary choice between unilateral executive action and formal congressional
authorization ignores the key insight that war powers processes malfunc-
tion when they are based on inadequate or inaccurate executive informa-
tion and disguised executive intent.  The consequences of an inadequately
informed war powers dialogue can be disastrous for the country, as the
wars that followed the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the 2002 AUMF
for the Iraq War demonstrate.315
In 2013, the interactive process brought out important executive infor-
mation.  Among other aspects, the hearings and other exchanges made
clear that it would not be simple to destroy all of Syria’s chemical weapons.
An air attack could inflict heavy damage on Syrian methods of delivering
chemical weapons, such as missiles, but disposing of the chemical weap-
ons stocks themselves could require an American effort on the ground.
311. See Kevin Liptak, How Obama Came to Launch Strikes in Syria, CNN (Sept. 23,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/23/politics/Obama-syria-strikes-policy/ (noting
that President Obama sought authorization from Congress in both cases).
312. Berman, supra note 291.
313. Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President, supra note 218, at 408– 09.  Congress has
authorized and funded an army, a navy, and an air force, and has specified an enemy.
The President is the Commander-in-Chief of all the forces, and, it is argued, it is up to
the President whether to use one, two, or all three. Id.
314. Tiefer, Appropriation Riders, supra note 23, at 291– 92, 342.
315. Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 62, at 447, 485.
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Conclusion
The 2013 Syrian chemical weapons crisis and the ISIS fight since 2014
have drawn mixed reviews among those focused on the binary question of
whether war-fighting has been authorized.  During the 2013 chemical
weapons crisis, it was unclear whether President Obama could have pro-
ceeded unilaterally, and some criticized him for inviting Congress to act.
During the ISIS conflict, some legal analysts questioned whether the 2001
and 2002 AUMFs authorized the military effort, and Congress was in no
rush to vote on a new authorization.
This Article advocates examining the war powers process rather than
merely the end point of that process, focusing on whether the war powers
dialogue proceeded in a democratic and legitimate way.  Viewed through
this framework, the actions of the political branches appear to be a success.
Congress and the President took part in substantive consultation and dia-
logue.  The public was able to become informed about the interests at stake
and the available options.  The nation, therefore, benefited from the war
powers dialogue between the two political branches.
Above all, this Article has looked for answers not by engaging in for-
mal, abstract analysis, but by examining the interactions between the
branches in their politico-legal context.  We can understand the nature of
constitutional war powers not by formalism or vague theorizing, but by
immersing ourselves in the details of how the political branches actually
interact so that we can see how each branch functions in the shadow of the
other.  It is only through such fact-intensive analysis that we can assess
whether the exercise of the nation’s war powers is democratic and
legitimate.
